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ABSTRACT

This dissertation addresses the relationship between
the Pigovian and Coasian schools of externality policy.
By varying the definition of the aggregate externality
constraint,

the results of Pigou as well as those of Coase

are obtained.

The Pigovian problem is one of public recep

tion of pollution;

the Coasian problem is one of locational

confinement of pollution.

The model shows that private

internalization will achieve efficiency in the Coasian
case where bargaining is possible regardless of the lia
bility rule.
Coasian case

Moreover,
(i.e.,

if bargaining is prohibited in the

the large number problem),

the e f f i 

cient tax policy differs from the standard Pigovian
unilateral tax.

v

INTRODUCTION

Since the "externality revolution" of the 1 9 6 0 's two
theoretical approaches have been accepted as offering ef f i 
cient solutions to spillover problems.

In terms of h i s 

torical development the work of A. C. Pigou comes first.
The Pigovian tradition is well summarized by Fisher and
Peterson.

(76, page 12)

Suppose a firm's production generates . . . an
externality that directly affects other economic
agents.
Then the marginal social cost of production
will diverge from the marginal private cost, and
the firm will produce "too much" pollution.
The
implied policy is to levy a tax equal to the d i f 
ference between marginal social and marginal
private costs.
Much later,

as externalities became a household word in the

profession,

an analysis by R. H. Coase began to have a

major impact on the theoretical discussion.

His results

have come to be known as the Coase Theorem.

The theorem

holds that when the actions of one firm affect another,
for competitive industries and in the absence of trans
actions costs,

the firms will be forced by their own m a x i 

mizing behavior to bargain to a solution that is socially
efficient.

While both Pigou and Coase seem to describe a

similar problem their solutions differ.

vi

Is it that the

problems differ,

or is one of the solutions theoretically

incorrect?
It has been suggested by many writers,

notably Buchanan

(73) , that the problems differ simply in terms of the number
of affected parties.
parties,

If there is a large number of affected

Pigovian policy is called for;'**

small number,

the Coase Theorem holds.

if there is a

However,

this

dichotomy does not resolve the conflict completely.

The

question of "Who should pay?" still confounds the corre ct 
ness of both the Pigovian tax and the Coase Theorem.
Baumol,
tradition,

in assessing C o a s e 's attack on the Pigovian

says that even in the large number case Coase's

arguments pose the following question:
sometimes be levied,

"Should not a tax

at least in part on those who choose

to live near the factory rather than upon the factory
owners?"

(72, Page 309)

Baumol answers this question

negatively and reaffirms the single Pigovian tax.
Meade

(52)

and Gould

(73)

show Pigovian taxing models where

the damaged party should be compensated.
Schulze and d'Arge
Hansmann

(77)

(74),

However,

Shapiro

Also, Tybout

(72),

(74), and more recently

all argue that the Coase solution fails to

achieve optimality under alternative definitions of pro
perty rights

(payment f l o w s ) .

^Although Coase and Buchanan may not agree with
Pigovian policy in any case, when the number of externality
affected parties is large, they offer no alternative.

vii

The basic controversy continues.
stances are Pigovian taxes,
ization,

Under what circum

as opposed to private internal

necessary to achieve efficiency?

If private

internalization fails, what is the appropriate structure
of the tax?

If private negotiation is possible, will the

parties correctly internalize the spillover?

The major

objective of this research is to suggest and to attempt
to clarify some of the answers to these three questions.
A model is developed that allows for either the Pigovian
or Coasian assumptions.

The Pareto welfare conditions are

derived and examined in each case.

Finally,

the policy

implications are discussed.
The findings of this research suggest two important
analytical points.

First,

a more elaborate taxonomy of

externalities than that offered by Buchanan is required.
The taxonomy offered by this research incorporates the
notion of public versus private externality reception,
presented by Meade

(52)

and Gould

as

(73), into the classi

fication scheme based on the number of externality affected
parties.

2

This more elaborate classification allows for

alternative representations of the aggregate externality

2

Although the definitions are pursued extensively in
Chapter II we can state here that public externality recep
tion occurs when the amount received by one firm does not
diminish the amount available to others.
A private exter
nality exists when the reception by one firm does limit the
reception by others.

viii

effects.

It is then shown under what circumstances

Pigovian policies are appropriate and where only Coasian
prescriptions yield efficiency.
The second analytical contribution offered by this
research is the importance of the notion that some exter
nalities are spatially bounded.

The locational restriction

imposed by this bounding limits the number of firms.

The

explicit recognition of locations confinement of spillovers*
allows the Coase Theorem to be viewed as an adaptation of
the efficiency properties of rents on land.

It also forms

a distinction between Coasian and Pigovian cases.
The models developed in this research draw on these
two contributions:

the extended taxonomy and the explicit

treatment of locational confinement of externalities.
conclusions of the research are:
applicable in certain cases,
previously demonstrated.

1)

The

The Coase Theorem is

some of which have not been

The Coase Theorem suggests optimal

taxing models that are not part of the Pigovian tradition;
2)

The unilateral Pigovian tax may be of only limited

importance

because few problems satisfy the conditions

that call for its application;

3) The bilateral tax/

subsidy scheme of Meade and Gould is efficient in certain
cases that may be more common than those calling for the
simple Pigovian tax.
The analysis yielding these results begins in Chapter
I with a review of the literature.

ix

A historical outline

of the existing literature is used.

Although the main

goal of the literature review is to outline the b a c k 
ground for the classification scheme used herein,

it should

also indicate to the reader the breadth of the rift between
the two schools.

Historically,

the Coase Theorem has clashed

with the Pigovian tradition of unilaterial taxes or sub3
sidies.
Baumol (72) opens his article with the statement,
"It is ironic that just at the moment when the Pigovian
tradition has some hope of acceptance in application it
should find itself under a cloud in the theoretical litera
ture."

(page 307)

Chapter II presents the alternative taxonomy drawn
from the literature cited in Chapter I.

Chapter III

develops the Pareto welfare model used to identify the
optimality conditions for the various types of ex t e r 
nality problems.

The optimality conditions are derived

and interpreted.

Chapter IV elaborates on the development

of the Pareto conditions of Chapter III for the Coasian
cases.

The importance of locational restriction for the

Coasian cases is discussed.

Chapter V demonstrates

the

validity of the Coase Theorem under zero transactions
costs and locational confinement of the externality.
Finally,

Chapter VI discusses the findings in terms

of the reconciliation of the Pigou-Coase controversy.

3

See,

especially,

Buchannan and. Stubblebine

x

(62).

The

claims of Coase and Pigou are set forth,

and a qualitative

d iscussion of the importance of each is undertaken.

The

goals of this research are to reconcile the Pigovian and
Coasian traditions,

to indicate the variations in the app r o

priate tax prescriptions,

to demonstrate the correctness

of the Coase Theorem and to develop its place in a general
outline of externality problems.
relevance of the Coase Theorem is,
Chapter VI.

xi

A discussion of the
then,

the major focus of

CHAPTER I
A REVIEW OF THE PERTINENT LITERATURE

Introduction
This research is initiated by the fact that there is
a pparently an unresolved conflict between the Pigovian and
Coasian schools of externality theory.

This conflict is

evidenced b y the arguments against the Pigovian tax made by
proponents of the Coase Theorem, b y disagreements among
Pigovian supporters concerning the form of the tax,

and by

propositions that efficiency does not obtain in the Coasian
case due to the effect of competitive entry and exit of
firms.

The purpose of this dissertation is to offer a

reconciliation of the competing traditions.

The purpose

of this chapter is to identify the inconsistencies in the
theory.
Specifically,
1)

the goals of this research are threefold:

develop an outline of externality problems which include

b o t h Pigovian and Coasian definitions;

2)

examine the type

of government p o li cy necessary where private internalization

1

2
is impossible;

3)

demonstrate the efficiency properties of

private internalization where it is possible.
This paper divides externalities

into four categories

bas e d on the distinctions b e tw ee n large or small numbers of
involved firms and public or private externality reception.
This distinction is important in achieving the first goal
of the study,

i.e., developing a complete outline of ex t e r 

nality problems.

Although the threads of such distinctions

exist in the current literature,

as discussed below,

the

externality literature has not made such distinctions

in a

rigorous fashion.
After discussing the debate betwe e n the followers of
Pigou versus those of Coase,

the recent literature on the

Coase Theorem itself is reviewed.

Special interest is

placed on the industry adjustment discussions of the con tr i
butors .
Before begin ni n g the review of the literature a formal
definition of externality is necessary to guide and limit
the research.
A technological externality exists when the actions of
one firm enter the production function of other firms and
there is no explicit market regulating these effects.
Hence,

the two modes for internalization of the spillover

are either government intervention or private bargai ni ng

among the individual parties.
Consider the following general form of a firm's p r o 
duction function.
fl(qi' x i' Y i' Y j ) = 0

i?^

Here the term "q^" is the output produced b y the i^h firm;
"xi " is its input;

"y^" is the variable measuring the spill

over produced b y the i ^ 1 firm;

and "y^" is the externality

received b y firm i from firm j.

The function f 1 (.)

specifies the relationship between these variables for the

tlr

i

firm.

This form may be simply expanded b y considering

the variables within f1 !.) as vectors
values.

Firm i is said to be the "producer" of an external

ity when y.
i

>0,

and a "receiver" when v.
“D

polluter refers to the case where y^
j^i.

instead of single

In other words,

>0.

> 0, and

The term
:3/
3f-y3y^

< 0,

firm i at the margin negatively

affects firm j 's production.

Review of the Literature:

Pigou versus Coase

A. C. Pigou is hailed as the first economist to define
externalities and to attempt to remedy the social welfare
loss arising from externalities.

While the p r ob le m and many

of the answers actually predate Pigou,^ he offers an explicit
4
See Johnson (73) who shows that as early as 1883,
Hen ry Sidgwick had a firm grasp of the problems of public
goods, the free rider, and potential problems with government
solutions.

4
tax/subsidy scheme as a solution to the prob le m of the
technological externality.

P i g o u 1s welfare criterion is

that the national dividend will be maximized if the m a r 
ginal social net products are equal.
exist,

If externalities

the marginal social net products deviate from the

private ones and welfare falls short of the maximum.
this occurs,

Whe n

Pigou claims it may be possible to achieve this

m a xi mu m by a set of taxes or subsidies that b r i n g private
and social products into equality.

Pigou was uncertain of

the computational details of this tax/subsidy, but he was
convinced that such values existed and were determinant.
Although Pigou's position was initially attacked by
some,

5

it gained professional acceptance and was further

developed.

Meade

(52) developed a specification of the

magnitude of the appropriate Pigovian tax/subsidy for the
special class of linearly homogeneous production functions.
At the same time Meade argued that in some cases bot h
taxes and subsidies are necessary to maximize social w e l 
fare.

This was the first mention of bilaterial intervention

Most notable was K n i g h t “s work (24).
Knight cites
other writers who held his opinion of P i g o u 8s work.

5
outside of reciprocal effects,^ and it is the beginning of
the public versus private externality distinction developed
in this paper.
The continued recognition of the Pigovian tax/subsidy
scheme is evidenced b y the treatment accorded it in such
traditional price theory texts as Henderson and Quandt
revised 7 1 ) 0

Notably,

(58,

the Henderson and Quandt treatment

is in terms of the Pareto welfare concept and they say
that the efficiency conditions can be deduced from the
actions of joint profit maximizing firms.

Those sectors of

the economy characterized by externalities could be thought
of as two firms.

Pareto optimality,

then,

requires the

joint profits of the two firms to b e maximized.
another way,

Stated

the Pareto requirements are that the price of

good one should equal the marginal costs of the production
of good one plus the marginal cost
benefit)

(or less the marginal

imposed on the production of good two.

and Quandt say:

"The quantities

Henderson

(of the two goods)

that

would be produced under joint profit maximization can be

6
The term reciprocal refers to the case where one
economic agent's activities affect another in the exter
nality sense, and at the same time the second party also
does something to affect the first.
This is the case of
a bilateral externality which, for simplicity's sake and
with no loss of generality, we can treat as separate cases.
However, Meade is referring to a bilateral tax/subsidy in
the case of a unilateral externality.
This is clearly
different from the standard Pigovian analysis.

6
enforced b y appropriately taxing and subsidizing producers
if they maxim i ze profits
Coase's w o r k

individually."

{58, page 217)"^

(60) was the first major attack on the

Pigovian posit io n to become accepted by the profession.
Coase claims that the private market can handle many of the
divergencies b e t w e e n social and private costs envisioned by
the writers of the Pigovian tradition.

Coase devotes con 

siderable space to considering types of externalities p r o 
p ose d b y Pigou and others where a voluntary solution c er
tainly could have,

or had bee n worked out.

His posi ti on against the Pigovian tradition is that
the mere existence of technological externalities

is not

sufficient to show the necessity for Pigovian taxes/subsidies.
In most if not all cases,

the externalities will be internal

ized b y the independent actions of the participants.

Coase

wondered why, whe n one observes spillover effects in the
real world,

it is automatically assumed because of their

simple existence they are at nonoptimal levels.

g

The

acceptance of the Pigovian taxing strictures seems to be
bas ed on such a b l i n d assumption.
7

The "if" in this statement certainly implies something
like the Coase Theorem.
Furthermore, most of the more recent
work on ba rg a i n i n g has done little more than reiterate this
analysis.

8

This is especially ironic since the Pigovian solution
may yield a situation where there is a non-zero level of
pollution.

7
One of Coase*s most famous examples
candy manufacturer and the d o c t o r A

is the case of the

doctor set up r e s i 

dence next to a confectioner who operated two machines in
the pursuit of his trade.

Things proce ed e d perfectly well

for some years until the doctor added a consulting room next
to the kitchen housing the machines.
of the machines,

Because of the noise

the doctor was p revented from

. . ex am 

ining his patients by auscultation for diseases of the chest
. . . (and finding it)

impossible to engage with effect in

any occupation whic h required thought and a t t e n t i o n . '"

He

b rought suit and won an injunction b a r ri ng the operation of
the machines, which the confectioner had been running for
60 and 26 years respectively.

Coase*s conclusion is that:

The court's decision established that the
doctor had the right to prevent the confectioner
from using his machinery.
But, of course, it
would have been possible to mod if y the arrange
ment envisaged in the legal ruling b y means of a
bargain betwe en the parties. . . . The solution
of the p r ob le m depends essentially on whether the
continued use of the m a ch i ne ry adds more to the c o n 
fectioner's income than it subtracts from the
d o c t o r 's .
More explicitly,

the court's ruling did nothing more than

define a property right that could then be sold to the h i g h 
est bidder.
lost,

Coase continues to explain that had the doctor

the result woul d have been the same except that the

9
Coase

(60), page 729.

8
payment flow w o u l d have gone in the opposite direction.
Coase argues that the income effects are included in the
same magnitude in both parties'

profit function regardless

of the direction of flow of the payment.

Nothing is changed

if the property right is reversed, because an opportunity
cost is the same as a direct c o s t . ^
Closely following C o a s e 1s article was one b y Buchanan
and Stubblebine

(62).

This article is a more rigorous

statement of the Coase Theorem.
other things,

They demonstrate,

among

that a Pigovian tax would not only be u n n e c e s 

sary but wou ld lead to inefficient solutions in many cases
of externalities.

Specifically,

they show that in exte rn al 

ity cases where individual ba rgaining among participants
possible

(i.e.,

inappropriate.

small number cases)

the Pigovian tax is

This point forms the basis

versus large numbers issue.

is

for the small

They choose to state their

case in utility maximization terms thereby avoiding the

10

Coase argues this by saying the part y receiving the
payment will treat the payment as an opportunity cost.
For
the party maki ng the payment it is a direct cost.
Note that
this payment forms the basis of the more recent work on b a r 
gaining models of externalities.
Also note that in terms of
the wealth effects for consumers, Dolbear (67) points out
that changes in wealth due to changes in the externality
property right, will change the optimal solution quantities
of the affected parties.

9
wealth distribution problem that might affect firms in long
run industry e q u i l i b r i a . ^
Buchanan and Stubblebine define various states of
exchange between two individuals interlocked in an external
ity.
brium,

Of importance is the fact that at the Pareto equili
the externality still has a marginal effect.

The

imposition of a Pigovian tax to reach Pareto optimality will
have the result that the negatively affected party will bid
the solution past Pareto optimality toward too little p o l l u 
tion .
■^Buchanan and Stubblebine lucidly handle the question
of the usage of the tax revenues that result from the govern
ment intervention.
Shibata (72) argues against the Buchanan
and Stubblebine treatment of the tax revenues and the p o s s i 
ble Pareto repercussions that might result.
Specifically,
Shibata tries to demonstrate that it is not the tax which
Buchanan and Stubblebine claim will lead to inefficiency b u t
the use of the revenues of the tax.
The Buchanan and
Stubblebine (72) reply to Shibata's criticisms is well
taken and forms the qist of the position we take concerning
the tax problem.
The Pareto conditions derived in the f o l 
lowing chapters are sets of relationships that show the
interactions b e t we en not only the production sectors of the
economy bu t also the consumption sector.
The first order
Pareto conditions must be met to achieve optimality.
But,
as is well known, there are an infinity of options from
which to choose.
Any complete fiscal policy must definitionally include some implicit or explicit definition or
redefinition of property rights.
Thus, for instance, if all
the optimal tax revenues are given consumer j , he will real 
locate his consumption pattern in line with a changed income
flow.
This in turn may affect the demand and supply curves
for goods and the resources respectively, but at the equi
librium point, the tax having been recomputed to account
for these changes in demand and supply, the relative prices
between the goods in the economy will have to embody the
stated Pareto conditions for efficiency to exist.

10
The Buchanan and Stubblebine position can best be sum
me d up b y the following quote:
The important implication to be drawn is that full
Pareto equilibrium can never be attained via the
imposition of unilaterally imposed taxes and sub
sidies until all marginal externalities are
eliminated.
(page 383)
W hi l e they do not state it explicitly,

the implication is

clear that the Pigovian policy is never applicable unless
it is unnecessary.
nated,

If marginal externalities are elimi

the Pareto optimum is attained.

Extending the analysis of Buchanan and Stubblebine,
Tur ve y

(63)

and Wellisz

(64)

show that large numbers of

affected parties will increase the transactions cost of a
b a r g a i n e d solution to the point that marginal external
ities,

in the Buchanan and Stubblebine sense,

This brou g ht forth the admission from Buchanan

are eliminated.
(66) that

the b a rg ai ni ng process would possibly cause the market to
move toward the optimal equilibrium, but bargaining costs
might prohibit the attainment of full optimality.
Finally,

Baumol

(72) makes the point that the Pigovian

tax is the appropriate m e c h a n i s m b y which to achieve op t i 
ma li t y when the bargaining cost of reaching a solution is
prohibitive.

Baumol states:

Despite the various criticisms which have been
raised against it, in the large numbers case,
which is of primary importance in reality and
to which Pigovian analysis directs itself, his

11
tax/subsidy programs are generally those required
for an optimal allocation of resources.
(page 3 0 7 ) ^
W hen there can b e no private interaction to internalize the
technological spillover,

the Pigovian unilateral tax p r e s 

criptions are appropriate.

The assumption that no inter

action is possible negates the Buchanan

and Stubblebine

attack on Pigovian taxes.
Baumol argues in what appears to be an a priori fashion
for Pigovian p ol i c y the same as Buchanan does against it.
The question of when the numbers are too large to allow
for a voluntary solution is left unanswered b y b o t h writers.
Tracing the literature in this fashion draws the focus
on the large/small distinction in the number of affected
parties?

in the small number case the parties can reach an

optimal solution, whereas

in the large number case the

unilateral Pigovian tax is called for.
However,

there is the objection to

the type of tax;

Baumol's arguments differ from Meade's interpretation of
the Pigovian tax.

The question of the nature of appropri

ate tax leads one to question further both the Pigovian
tradition and Coase's theorem if in fact they are reconciled
in terms of the number of affected parties.
■^Baumol's disclaimer, "generally," refers to the ful
fillment of second order conditions which would affect any
solution.
In an earlier work (64) he had made the argument
that the second order conditions of externality-affected
profit maximization woul d rarely be fulfilled.

12
Public Versus Private Externalities
Baumol clearly states that his
neither taxes upon

"solution calls for

(the receiving firms),

nor compensation

to that industry for the damage it suffers,"
Kneese and B o w er

(68)

(72, page 311).

agree that taxing the pollution alone

will achieve the social optimum if b ar g ai ni ng is preeluded.
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However,

other writers claim that compensation

must be made to achieve the optimum solution.
B a u m o l 1s claim is simple.
require that the price

(P^)

The Pareto conditions

•'■n t^ie pollution producing

industry reflect b o t h the cost of that good and the cost
imposed on the p o ll u ti on receiving industry;
ments on price

(l^

the require

t*ie pollu ti on receiving industry do

not show that P^ should reflect any extra remuneration
real terms).

(in

He says this makes perfe ct ly good sense because

the cost of the pollu ti on itself

(the smoke) will limit

entry into the po l l u t e d industry

(the laundry).

He states:

A high tax rate will discourage smoke and hence
encourage m ig ra ti o n into the neighborhood.
A low
tax rate wil l encourage smoke and, hence, drive
residents away.
A tax on smoke alone is all that
is needed to control the magnitudes of both var i
ables.
That is why, as shown b y the mathematics
of the p r e c e d i n g section, just a tax on the smoke
producer is sufficient to produce an optimal allo 
cation of resources among all the activities in
our model.
(72, page 312)

Kneese and Bowe r

(68), page 100.
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Later on he reports that Coase,

in a letter,

expresses

concern that the tax will not be adjusted if more laundries
enter the polluted

area.

Baumol writes:

But even on this issue Coase's strictures are
not necessarily valid.
Suppose that a regulator,
having no wa y of calculating the optimal values of
the Pigovian tax is, however, able to determine the
value of any marginal social damage
at any po i n t in
time.
"Faut de mieux" he therefore
sets a tax rate
equal to current marginal social damage on
the
smoke producer.
This causes hi m to
reduce his
smoke, and so brings more laundries into the n e i g h 
borhood.
The tax is then readjusted to equal the
new (higher) value of damage per puff of smoke,
more laundries move in, and so on.
Will this p r o 
cess of trial and error adjustments of the tax
level, always setting it equal to current marginal
smoke damage, converge to the optimum of Section
II? That is, will the sequence of tax values con 
verge to the optimal Pigovian tax level, and will
resource allocation approach optimality?
That now
seems to be C o a s e 1s main question, (page 315)
He then explains that given the usual assumptions of c on
vexities the system will be stable.
However,

the mathematical expression of Baumol's model

is not constrained to negative externalities and,

therefore,

implies that the receiver of a positive externality should
not have to pay for the reception of such.

Meade's a r t i c l e ^

on bees and externalities argues against such a scheme.
While both authors agree that the producer of an externality

Meade

(52).
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should receive treatment b y the taxing au th or i t y , 15 Meade
claims that the receiver of an externality should also pay
or receive compensation so that an optimum will be achieved.
Meade uses a number of different models but in his
most simple case he has two industries characterized b y the
following production functions:
x

= H 1 (l1 , c ^ , x )

x 2 = H 2 (12 , c 2 ) ,
where

"1" is labor and "c" is capital,

and the externality

is positive.

Both functions are assumed to be linearly

homogeneous.

A social optimum exists,

he asserts,

when the

value of the marginal social net product is equal to the
marginal payment made to each factor.
ing factor; hence,

Capital is the h i r 

its payment is the residual of output

less labor's payment.

The assumption of homoge ne it y implies

that the summation of elasticities with respect to output
and each factor will equal one;

i.e.,

xi
X!
xx
E.
+ E
+ E
il
C1
x2

=1.

Meade shows that c^ must be taxed at the rate of

X 1 X1
— E
C1

x2

15
Such treatment would be taxation of pollution and
subsidization of a positive externality.

15

in order to be paid the value of its marginal social net
product.

This result is in direct contradiction to Baumol's

conclusions.
Both Baumol and Meade agree that the "producer" of the
externality should be compensated or taxed commensurate with
the nature of the externality.

However,

in one model the

"receiver" also undergoes treatment by the taxing authority
while in the other it is left alone.

(Where the taxing

authority is unconcerned with the receiver,

the magnitude

of the externality itself determines the amount of resources
expended in the externality receiving i n du st ry .)
Even though his analysis discusses the notion of an
unpriced factor, Meade's verbal arguments are in terms of
atmospheric effects.

His terminology and verbal arguments

clearly guide the analysis toward a distinction between
public and private effects.

A paper by Gould

(73) takes up

Meade's verbal arguments and develops the difference between
types of externalities b as e d on their reception character
istics.

Gould distinguished between public and private

externalities calling private externalities free access
common-property or non-exclusive)
use of the term,

resources.

(or

In the normal

a common access resource is a private good

for which property rights are not enforced.

Gould's con

cept of this free access resource is that the receivers of
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a positive externality will impose externalities on each
other if there is no charge for the resource.
does not formally state the concept,
clear:

While he

the implication is

the externalities that the receivers impose on one

another are the type that are purely pecunia ry in normal
markets.

Because the externality is scarce,

reauires that it be rationed by price.
externality is not scarce

optimality

Conversely,

if the

(i.e., public in its reception)

no charge is warranted.
Following the article b y Gould the profession seems to
accept now that there are two levels of distinction in
externality theory,

even though these two have not been

acceptably integrated.

Buchanan

(73) offers what might

be considered a summary of the two.
Buchanan's taxonomy.

Table 1-1 presents

A negative externality is assumed:

Firm One(s) pollute(s)

Firm Two(s).

In Buchanan's opinion

Cases 1 through 8 characterize all possible states of exter
nality situations.

The entries in Table 1-1 indicate the

Pareto optimality results that Buchanan predicts.
In Case 3, Buchanan seems to grasp the issue of p u b l i c 
ness.

Here, he seems to be saying that it is the publicness

of the reception that causes inefficiency.

However,

in Case

4, which according to Meade-Gould should be the reciprocal
of Case 3, Buchanan drops the notion of public reception.

TABLE 1-1
BUCHANAN'S OUTLINE OF EXTERNALITIES

One Firm One
One Firm Two

CASE 1 - Bargaining yields
efficient solution

CASE 2 - Bargaining yields
efficient solution

One Firm One
Many Firm Twos

CASE 3 - Inefficiency results due
to publicness interaction
among Firm Twos

CASE 4 - Inefficiency due to
holdout powers of
each Firm Two

Many Firm Ones
One Firm Two

CASE 5 - Efficiency results with
minor bargaining costs

CASE 6 - Efficiency results
with minor bargain
ing costs

Many Firm Ones
Many Firm Twos

CASE 7 - Inefficiency results due to
publicness interaction
among Firm Twos

CASE 8 - Inefficiency results
due to holdout power
of each Firm Two

Firm One(s) Has (Have)
Legal Property Right

Firm Two(s) Has (Have)
Legal Property Right
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He claims it is the free rider problem

(or high bargai nin g

costs or the large number question) which causes ineffici
ency.

Holdout power refers to the free rider prob le m which

is not necessarily caused b y publicness.

The implication of

the M ea de -G ould analysis is that a unilateral tax on Firm
One is appropriate in the public case.

Hence,

of true publicness of externality reception,

in the case

if we were to

cure the holdout problem in Buchanan's Case 4, bargaini ng
wou ld still y i el d an inefficient result because Firm Twos
receive payments.

Furthermore,

the mere existence of many

externality receivers is not sufficient to cause a failure
in bargaining.

Clearly, Buchanan has not presented the true

ramifications of the concept of publicness.

Cases 7 and 8

may have elements of either publicness or privateness,
are

but

inefficiently cured by the market because of the large

number problem.

It is, therefore,

not clear whether

Buchanan is referring to the large number problems when he
uses the term public or whether he is alluding to Gould's
concept of it.
The confusion that arises over the relationship of the
Pigovian and Coasian schools leads to doubt about the valid
ity of the Coase Theorem.

The question of who should pa y in

the

Pigovian case leads to a question

the

Coasian case.

of who should pay in

This then leads to the question of the
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efficiency properties of the Coase Theorem when industry
adjustments are accounted for.

Industry Adjustments and the Coase Theorem
The most recent literature abounds with mathematical
proofs of the Coase Theorem.

1fi

These proofs are bas ed upon

the equality bet ween the first order conditions for Pareto
optimality in an economy affected by externality problems
and the first order conditions of profit maximization for
one-on-one b ar ga ining solutions.

However,

these efforts to

establish the validity of the Coase Theorem are incomplete
in their handli ng of industry adjustments.
The que stion of long run versus short run industry
equilibria has be e n approached in the literature from time
to time,

though seldom in a rigorous m a n n e r . ^

The pro-

Coasian pos iti on is expressed aptly by Calabresi:
Various w r i t e r s — including m e — accepted that co n
clusion (Coase Theorem) for the short run, bu t had
doubts about its validity in the long run situ
ation. . . .
Further thought has convinced me that if one
assumes no transactions cos ts — including no costs
16

The b es t work to date is by Gifford and Stone (73).
Another article by Gifford (74) presents the implied graphical
analysis in total prof it terms.
^ T h e exceptions are Tybout (72) and Schulze and
d'Arge (74) whose analyses are incorrect.
Both find that
inefficiency results.
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of excluding from the benefits the free loaders,
that is those who wou ld gain from a bargain but
who are unwilling to p a y to bring it about— and if
one assumes, as one must, rationality and no legal
impediments to bargaining, Coase's analysis must
hold for the long run as well as for the short run.
The reason is simply that (on the given assumptions)
the same type of transaction would also occur to
cure the long run ones.
(68, page 67)
The other writers

referred .to b y Calabresi are Bramhall and

Mills who in criticizing a work b y Kamien,
Dolbear

Schwartz,

and

(66) poin t out that:

Under the payments scheme, profits will be larger
than they wou ld have been in the absence of inter
vention and under the fee scheme profits will be
smaller than in the absence of intervention.
On
the usual assumptions about entry and exit, entry
will take place in the former case and exit in the
latter case.
Entry will lower the price of this
product relative to prices of other products, and
exit will raise it.
Thus, relative prices will,
in the long run, be different under the payments
scheme than under the charges scheme.
Since rela
tive prices w i l l differ, the choice between the
two schemes is partly a matter of efficiency and
not, as Kneese concludes, entirely a matter of
equity.
(66, pages 615 and 616)
Gifford and Stone

(74)

attempt to refute this argument by

poin ti ng out that under the payments scheme,

the payer will

only pa y if its profits increase.
The p r ob le m w i t h these arguments is that they do not
really answer the relevant question:
to inefficient results
bargaini ng is possible?

Will firm entry lead

in externality situations where
The analysis of Gifford and Stone

is confined to the short run profit maximization of two
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firms and is ineffective for two reasons.

First,

their

bargaining model does not tell us h o w the number of firms in
each industry react to changes in the bargain ing decision of
individual firms.

Their statement that payment will be

forthcoming only if it is profit abl e ma y be the answer but
Gifford and Stone do not show why.
model,

Second,

their bargaining

as an analysis of the short run actions of firms,

not universal.

Basically,

is

they assume the result b y not

telling the reader h o w the bargainers actually bargain.

1R

Various writers have addressed industry adjustments
directly,

though none have done so correctly.

and Schulze and d'Arge
a variable.

However,

Tybout

(7 2)

(74) all treat the industry size as
because their definition of the exter

nality problem is Pigovian rather than Coasian,

their

results are incorrect.
On the other hand,

Nutter

(68)

followed by Shapiro

(74) uses the correct definition of externality.

Nutter

points out that the important aspect in the cattle-wheat
case of Coase is whether cattle will be raised on a plot
of land adjoining wheat production.

He recognizes the

site-specific nature of the externality problem.

18

The

Their model is only a description of two profit func
tions which yield the joint profit maximizing results w i t h 
out explicitly assuming a joint profit maximizing model.
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importance of rents on these plots is also recognized.
Cattle production will only occur next to wheat production,
if the "cruasi-rents" associated with the two together are
at least as great as alternative values of the land.
Nutter concludes his analysis with the statement that
the necessary prior existence of rent assures the Coase
Theorem.

However,

Nutter and later Shapiro do not recognize

that the rent associated wi t h the pollution generating
activity is a variable that adjusts as the industry sizes
adjust.

As the rent adjusts it guides production toward

the efficient solution.

It is the competitive adjustment

mechan ism acting through these rents that is the focus of
the proof of the Coase The ore m pre se nte d in Chapters V and
VI.

Summary
The current externality literature pertaining to the
Coase Theorem is incomplete.

First,

the Coase Theorem is

not compatible in a theoretical sense with the Pigovian
school even though they address the same problem.

This is

true even though proponents of bo th schools admit the valid 
ity of the other's arguments in limited circumstances.
Second,

the val idity of the Coase The orem when industry

adjustments are considered stands under a theoretical cloud.
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The result of these two pro ble ms is that the importance and
application of Coase's pro posit io n cannot be fully app reci
ated.
While there are many similar lines of analysis r u n 
ning through the externality literature there is none which
completely integrates the various approaches.

Such an

outline is the first goal of this dissertation and is the
purpose of the next chapter.

As shown in later chapters,

by combining the large/small numbers classification with
the public/private reception dichotomy the arguments of
the major contributors will all find a place.

CHAPTER II
AN ALTERNATIVE TAXONOMY

Introduction
The review of the literature shows that there are many
ways of viewing externality problems.
grates two of these.

Specifically,

This chapter inte

the classification

scheme of "large or small numbers" of externality affected
parties is joined with the classification scheme of "public
or private reception."
externality problems.

This produces a fourfold outline of
From this outline the appropriate

specifications of the externality can be deduced.

These

alternative specifications are used to derive Pareto welfare
conditions that are consistent with

the differing policy

prescriptions of Pigou and Coase.
Consider the matrix in Table II-l.

TABLE II-l
OUTLINE OF EXTERNALITIES

Large Number

Small Number

I

IV

II

III
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Public
Private
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The purpose of this chapter is to examine the taxonomy in
Table II-l.

This will be done by,

first,

analyzing indivi

dually the classification schemes of large/small numbers
and public/private reception.

Attention is paid to the

underlying assumptions in each.

Then,

the various types

of externalities are discussed and illustrative examples
are offered.
It will be shown in the following chapters that:
Type I is the case for which the unilateral Pigovian tax
is appropriate;

Type II requires a bilateral tax;

Type III

is the case developed by Coase in his path-breaking article;
Type IV is probably unsolvable except by government reg ul a
tion.

Together these four types effectively address all

knov/n technological externality problems.

The Large/Small Numbers Classification
The distinction between large and small numbers is one
based on transactions costs.

In bargaining,

there is a

potential gain to any party from holding out, which,
number of parties involved becomes large,
bitively high transactions costs.
called the "free rider" problem.

as the

results in prohi

(This phenomenon is often
)

The costs of negotiating

^ A c t u a l l y , there are many variations of the "free
rider" concept.
We use the term only as indicated above.
Also, the term transactions costs is used in the sense of
reaching a voluntary agreement where no formal market exists.
In addition to the cost resulting from strategic behavior
it includes the costs of decision making for each individual,
administrative costs, etc.
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a voluntary solution will be a function of the number of
parties affected.

Thus,

solutions to technological ext er 

nality situations will in general depend on the number of
participants.

We define the small number case as one where

these transaction costs are zero, and the large number case
as one where they are infinite.

Furthermore,

it is assumed

that while individual transactions costs are infinite in the
large number case,

the administrative costs of determining

and imposing the perfect tax are z e r o . ^
course,

In practice,

these definitions are too str ict .21

of

However,

theoretically they allow the two extremes to be distin
guished without cluttering the analysis with a measure of
transactions cost.

2^In practice the result will always be that the m a r g i 
nal cost of administering a tax and the marginal inefficiency
of the tax m e c h a n i s m employed must be compared to the marginal
benefit of its imposition.
This assumption merely allows
us to use the theoretical concept of a tax as an alternative
to the private action of individuals.
For an important
discussion of taxing methods see Johnson (69).
?1

Note that the free rider problem is not a problem that
absolutely prohibits an efficient solution.
Even in the case
of the free rider problem in pure public goods, the optimal
solution is definable and the political mechanis m is ava i l 
able to overcome the inability of the market to achieve the
Lindahl solution.
The Wicksellian rule allows each person's
small mar gina l effect to be important enough for the indivi
dual to state his true preferences.
The problem is that in
the real wo rl d the costs of reaching this solution as the
number of participants becomes large may be prohibitive.
However, some research, notably V. Smith (73), show that
the Wi cksellia n rule may be practicable.

2

/

The Public/Private Classification
Public externalities have the property that the re c e p 
tion by one firm does not diminish the amount potentially
available to others.

The definition is the same as that

for public goods presented by Samuelson

(54,

55).

Per

externalities this implies that the quantity of the spill
over effect received by one firm is not affected by the
number of other firms receiving the effects.
type of externality assumed by Baumol
factory-laundry example.

(72)

This is the

in his classic

It is also a common assumption

of writers in the Pigovian tradition.
Formally we can write n^y^ = ^ 2 ' w here n^ is the number
of firms in the externality producing industry, y-, is the
amount of the externality produced by each firm,

and y 7 is

the amount received by each firm in the receiving industry.
This specification embodies the public reception charac ter 
istics because the amount produced,
anyone to receive.

n-^y^, is available for

The number of receiving firms,

not affect the amount received by any one.
received can,
stant.

in this case,

n 2 , does

The total amount

increase even if n^y-^ stays co n

As the number of receivers,

n 2 , increases the total

reception increases.
Note that the measurement of the externality is in
terms of the magnitude of the units received.
dispersion factor or distance factor,
public externality.

Clearly,

of expressing the externality.

etc.,

There is no

included in the

this is a most simplified way
The vagaries of weather and
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other factors are casually dismissed.
reasons.

First,

This is done for two

other writers have done this so it is co n

tinued here for

comparability.

Second, we are most con

cerned with the

distinction between public and private.

A

public externality is one that is available at the same
level to all receivers.
cates this definition.

A dispersion factor only compli
For instance,

if a dispersion factor

is included and the externality is negative all receivers
will move as far away as possible.

If the pollution is

received at all

it will be received at the minimum level

all firms.

opposite occurs for positive externalities.

Thus,

The

the specification y 2 = n 2_Y]_f though simplified,

appropriate for public externalities.

by

is

The level n^y-^ is

defined in the same dimension as y 2 merely for convenience.
Private externalities are such that the amount received
by one firm does reduce the amount available to others.
There are two situations that give rise to a private exter 
nality.

The simple case is one where the amount received

by one firm actually removes externality units from the
amount available to others.
as n 2_Yj_ = n 2 ^ 2 '

This situation can be written

T^ e amount received by one firm is an in

verse function of the total number of receiving firms,
The total amount received is constrained to n^y^.

n 2<

In

terms of the specification of the externality this situation
is identical

to a normal market sale of an input by one

industry to another.
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The other situation that causes the externality to be
private is that of locational restriction of the external
effects.

In some cases,

externality effects can be co ns i d 

ered to be spacially bounded.

The production of an exter 

nality at one point spills forth with diminishing impact as
it moves away from the origin.

For simplicity,

the externality is produced in one area,

assume that

completely fills

that area with equal intensity but does not cross over into
the next area.
fined.

Thus,

the externality is locationally co n

The importance of this assumption is that the m a x i 

mu m number of firms receiving the externality in one area
will be fixed if spatial requirements of firms are positive.
In the simplest case,

the maxi mu m number is one;

nality is then "one-on-one.”
receivers is limited,

the ext e r 

Mhere the number of potential

scarcity of the locations will cause

the externality to be private.
Strictly speaking the max imum number of firms in a
given area is not fixed.

One need only look at the acres of

beach and number of hotel rooms in Miami now compared to 100
years ago to find evidence of this.
market price.

However,

Both are functions of

for simplicity,

it is assumed that

locations are perfectly inelastically supplied in a given
area and that firms require a fixed amount of space.

Thus,

the maximum number of firms in any area is fixed.
In the one-on-one case of locational confinement of the
spillover,

the externality specification is simply y^ = y .

The amount produced by one firm is identical to that
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received by another.

Only one firm can receive the effects.

Locational restriction of the spillover effects can occur in
the large number case by mo di fyi ng the assumption of "oneon-one" association.

For instance,

y-^ >_ I<y2 says that the

amount of the externality produced by one firm can be
9 2

received by up to X fir ms.”

If the externality is negative there must be a binding
constraint on the number of locations for pollution to
exist at all.

With no limit on locations externality

receiving firms would always avoid pollution.

The Various Externality Types
Type I externalities are large number,
tion cases.

public recep

This is the type implicitly assumed by Baumol

in the factory-laundry example.

Embodied in this classic

example is the assumption that there is such a large number
of producers and receivers
Furthermore,

that bargaining is prohibited.

the reception of the effects by one laundry

has no effect on the quality of the air and,

hence,

does

not effect the amount of the externality available to
others.

Baumol does not consider the scarcity of loca

tions within the polluted area.

The implicit assumption

is that the number of firms receiving the pollution is
unconstrained.
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It should be noted that if K is defined as the
maximum number of firms in a given area, the externality
is private only if n£ > K.
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Type II externalities are characterized by large number
and private reception.

As noted above,

sible causes of the private externality:

there are two p o s 
scarcity of the

externality itself or scarcity of locations to receive it.
In the estuaries of the southeastern United States,

small

shrimp grow to nearly commercial size before returning to
the ocean where they are harvested.

Commercial activities

in the estuaries affect the amount of shrimp leaving.

The

external effects are of the large number type because of
the many lease holders of the marsh and the many shrimpers.
The externality is private because each shrimp caught is
one fewer to be caught by others.

Scarcity of locations

may be a constraint here due to congestion.
An alternative example of Type II externalities,
embodying locational restriction,

is that of bees.

case of bees can be large number or small number,
is always private.

77

one
The

but it

The pollination provided by a swarm

is only occurring in the group of trees within the area of
the swarm.

If the swarm occurs over a large enough area,

the externality might be of the large number variety.
Because locational confinement of a spillover causes
it to be private,

any externality affecting firms that

have a plant with large spatial requirements must be
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The bees and apples
externality comes rrom Meade
(52).
Assume the externality is a positive one where bee
keeping affects the growth of fruit as well as producing
honey.
We will not consider the bilateral possibilities
of this problem, i.e., fruit growing affecting the quantity
of honey.
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private.

For instance,

Baumol's example of the factory-

laundry is best analyzed as a private externality.
in terms of producers,

Thus,

a realistic example of a purely

public externality is hard to find.

Hov/ever,

for consumer

cases the aesthetic deterioration of tourist areas co n
forms to the Type I definition.
Type III externalities exist w hen the number of parties
is small enough to facilitate bargaining.

This type may

exist due to privateness generated by locational res tri c
tion or by quantity reduction of the externality due to
reception.

However,

the site-specific nature of the

external effects seems to exist even in this latter case.
Thus,

Type III is always modeled as a locationally con

fined externality problem.

Bees are a good example.

The

number of trees in the area of the swarm will affect the
number of trees covered by the swarm.
swarm is small,

If the area of the

the externality is Type III simply for

this reason.

Noise is a good example of pure locational

confinement.

Even though the noise is available at a co n 

stant level to all in the immediate area,
area is limited and so is the externality.

the immediate
24

Note that in the case of noise we have an example
of dispersion associated with multiple locations receiv
ing exactly the same level of the externality.
Noise can
be thought of as emanating from a point and moving out in
concentric circles of decreasing decibel levels.
Di s
missing the dispersion factor in the one-on-one case assumes
that the single reception site is all of the surrounding
area from origin to the point where the noise is indis
tinguishable .
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Finally,

for Type IV externalities to exist,

it is

necessary that a small number of firms receive an ext er 
nality publicly.

This means that there must be an unlimited

number of firms which could receive the effects,

but that in

practice the number will be small enough to facilitate b a r 
gaining.

Type IV externalities are not analysed in this

paper.

Summary
This chapter has introduced and discussed the three 
fold outline of externalities used in the remaining
chapters.

Actually,

the outline includes four types but

the last type is not important in terms of the reconci li
ation of the Pigovian and Coasian traditions.
The logical flow of the argument pursued in this
research is to develop a taxonomy that includes all known
classes of externalities.
this taxonomy,

For the classes outlined by

the alternative externality specifications

are then developed.

Using these specifications,

the Pareto

conditions are derived and are compared to the policy p r e 
scriptions of Pigou and Coase.

This chapter has addressed

the first two points in this procedure:

the taxonomy

has been presented and the externality specifications
discussed.
Type I and III externalities offer unique specifi
cations of the spillover effects that are consistent with
the catagories from which they are drawn.

For Type I,

^ 2 ~ n l^l exPresses the public reception.

The large
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number aspect has no affect on the externality identity.
For Type III, y^ = Y 2 embodies both the strict one-onone locational con finement of the externality and the
small number requirement.
Type III externalities have two specifications because
there are two possible causes of privateness of exter 
nality reception.

First,

an actual reduction in the

quantity of the externality may result from the reception
by one firm.

This can be modeled as n-^y^ = ^ 2 ^

0

-

In tlie

specification this case is identical to a normal market
input.
ure,

It is an externality because of some market fail

for instance,

a common access resource.

Alternatively,

the externality may be Type II because its effects are
locationally confined.

This specification in the large

number case is y-^ _> K y 2 *

The only difference between

this and a Type III externality is that the number K is
assumed large enough to prohibit bargaining.

CHAPTER III
THE MATURE OF EXTERNALITY AND EFFICIENCY

Introduction
As previously stated,

the main goal of this paper is

to reconcile the Pigovian and Coasian approaches to the
externality problem.

It was suggested in Chapter II that

the four type taxonomy of externalities based on the
large/small number and public/private reception classif i
cation schemes could be used to reconcile these two schools.
In order to do so,

it is necessary to derive the Pareto

welfare conditions for an economy constrained by ext er 
nality problems of these various types.

In other words,

by using the technical definitions of the aggregate exter
nality developed in the last chapter,

we should be able

to generate both Pigou's policy prescriptions as well as
C o a s e 's .
This chapter first defines externality production and
reception and states the assumptions about the production
functions used in this research.

Second,

a Pareto welfare

model is devised that includes externality constraints
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consistent with the definition of Types I, II, and III.
Finally,

the resulting Pareto conditions are discussed.

Before beginning the analysis,

25

a few words about the

general assumptions governing the model are in order.
Throughout,

only competitive industries are considered.

No discussion of any monopoly or otherwise imperfectly
competitive situations is undertaken.

All firms

in an

industry are identical and possess U-shaped cost curves
so that the number of firms is det erminate at the compe 
titive equilibrium.

The competitive equ ilibrium is assumed

to exist.

resources are assumed to be perfectly

Moreover,

mobile at zero cost.

This assumption has the special

application to the relocation of firms in those cases
where the externality is site specific.

As stated before,

in tnose cases where bargain in g costs are assumed zero
(the small number case)

all possible transactions are

included.

Externality Production
In the production of externalities the quantity of
output and the quantity of the externality are treated as
joint products of the application of some set of resources.

9S

" A c t u a l l y the Pareto conditions for Type III ext er 
nalities -will not appear at this point to be completely
representative of Coase's arguments.
This relationship
is developed in Chapters IV and V.
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Consider the following implicit production function

°6

for the externality producer:
f

1 ( q 1 ,

y±'

K i'

*

•

• '

In this production function,
the firm,
and "x^,
n.

x n )

=

0

"q^" is the normal output of

"y-j_" is the amount of the e x t e r n a l i t y produced,
. . ., xn " are the amounts of the inputs one through

Ignoring any effects on y^, we assume that f 1 !*)

is

such that 3q-^/3x^ follows the normal assumptions of increasing and then decreasing returns for all i = 1 . . .n.
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This assumption generates the normal U-shaped short run
cost curves.
The simplest relationship between q^ and v

, can be

found by taking the total differential of the production
function,

dividing through by dq^,

equal to zero.

This yields:

1)

= “f V f 1
q y

3y /3q
i l

and setting all dx^/dq

The sign of - f 1/ f 1 is assumed to be non-negative.
If the
q y
sign of this term is positive, it implies that an increase
0 i~<.

Whi tcomb (72) has argued that the production function
specification used here offers too many degrees of freedom.
He claims the appropriate specification for the externality
producing firm is
q = f (x x , . . . , xn )
y = h (x-j_, . . . , xn )
This specification does not allow for a tradeoff between q
and y holding all Xj_ constant.
However, as shown in the
text, the more general specification includes his case and
yields the same results.
27

This assumption is made for both producers and receivers
of externalities.
Hence, the convexity of the production
constraints for the economy is assured at the point of com
petitive equilibrium.

in

increases

9o
while holding all x c o n s t a n t . I f

- f V f 1 is zero, the good and externality are fixed proq Y
portion joint products.
The constrained profit function
of a firm which faces the prices {P , P , P . , i=l • . .n}
<5
y
x
9n
for its output, externality"
and inputs, respectively, is:

7T = P cr + P v
- ZR x + d)f1 (a. , y , x. , . . . , x )
q*l
y* 1
i i i
1
1
1
n
Profit maximizing conditions imply the following:

i = 1 . . . n.
The profit maximizing firm producing an externality
for which it confronts a marginal price
tive)

(positive or neg a

will sum the marginal revenue products of the output

and externality and set this equal to the price of each
input.

If we simplify the analysis at this point by c o n 

sidering only one input,

the terms

3a /3x.
“X

and 3y./3x.

l

X

in Equation 1 become dq^/dx^ and dy /dx^.

2.

Rewriting, we

have
P

= R/(dq /dx ) - P (dy /dq )
i i
y
i
l

h

where P. is the price of the single input.

The tern

R/(dq./dx ) is the marginal cost of output;
i l

P,(dy /dq )
y
l
-1

is the value an incremental unit of q^ has through its

9o
Air pollution produced by cars tends to exhibit
this property.
The timing advance can be changed decreasing
pollution as well as output (miles per gallon) .
29

P

may be considered to be a tax,

bribe paicl by another firm.

a subsicy,

or a
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effect on y^.

If y^ is a negative externality and the firm

is forced to pay the marginal cost of this pollution,
would be negative.

The term -P

y

(dy / d a
i
i

y
) would shift up

the marginal cost curve of the firm forcing a lower level of
production of q

.

This shift is shown in Figure III-l.

Externality Reception
The characteristics of the effect of the externality
on the receiving firm are the same as any other input,
except that the effect may be either to decrease or to
increase output depending on the sign of the externality.
We may write the general production function for the
receiving firm as:
f 2 ( q 2 '

Y 2 '

x i'

•

•

•'

x n^

=

0

•

The term "q-," is the output
of the firm;
are the normal inputs;

"x-,1 , . .

n

"y9 " is the quantity of the exter 

nality received from some other firm.

As indicated the

effects of the externality are treated like another input
in the function f 2 (-).

Because there is only one output,

f 2 (*) can be writ ten in explicit for m,33 i.e.,
q n - F 2 (y9 , x ^ , . . ., x ) = f 2 (-).
The partial of f 2 (*) with respect to each x^ is
assumed to follow the normal assumptions of increasing and
then decreasing returns.

The sign of the term 3q2/3y2 =

- f 2/ f 2 defines the type of externality,
y
i

positive or negative.

^ T h e implicit production function form is used only
for symmetry in the derivation of the Pareto conditions.
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$

MC
dx

-P

dy

q

Figure III-l
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If 9q2/3y 2 i-s zero,

no relevant externality exists at thai

point.

It is assumed that 3 2q 0/3y 2 < 0 for positive
^
z
o1
externalities and > 0 for negative externalities.
The
constrained profit function of the externality receiving
firm where y

is unpriced and where the firm has no con-

trol over v n :

^

Because

=

pqq2

“

S R j_x i

3tt/3 v 2 = ^~y'

Pq 3q7/3y^.

+

'

x i'

*

'

*'

anc^ ^ = ~'Pc //^cr' v/e

As expected,

effect on profits)

Z(q2' '12

'

that 3r/3y2 =

the marginal value of

(its

is the rate at which it increases

output mea sured in terms of the price of output.
The term 3x. /3 vn is assumed
i *z
n.

to be zero for all i=l...

The externality will either increase or decrease the

output of q^ holding the other inputs constant but it will

31

Although there are many other ways of looking at
the effect of the externality (especially in terms of
shifts in the cost c u r v e s ) , these will not be important
for later derivations and are dismissed here.
For dis
cussions of the issue of separability see, e.g., Davis
and Wh inston (6 2) and Dusansky and Kalman (72) .
32

Because we treat the receiving firm as unable to
directly control the quantity of the externality, it is
not necessary to consider the externality effect with a
nonzero price.
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not affect the quantity of the other inputs.

3

This

treatment is consistent with the notion that the ext er
nality is treated simply as another input,

albeit one over

which the firm may have no control.

The Model
The purpose of the Pareto welfare models presented
in this chapter is to derive the efficiency conditions
for Type I, II, and III externalities.

The specification

of the aggregate externality constraint forms the di f
ference between the three models and, hence,

constitutes

the difference in the efficiency conditions.

33
The limitation of treating the externality such that
its effect is only felt on output is that it may be more
realistic to hypothesise that one or more of the inputs are
the media for the introduction of the externality.
In this
case 3 y 2 / 3 xj_ may not be zero for some i=I...n.
If we assume
that 9 y 2 / 3 xy is greater than zero for some i, then the
result is that more of the resource is used if f£/f,?f is
positive and less is used if the externality is negative.
Another possible assumption might be that the exter 
nality affects the quantity of one of the resources, where
the resource is measured in efficiency units.
If 3 x y / 3 y 2
is not equal to zero the
effect shows up as an increased
value of d n / d y ? .
Where previously the value of y 2 was the
value of the direct effect of Y 2 on 0 3 , it now includes
both this effect and the value of the marginal product of
the ith resource times 9 xj_/3 y 2 . In other words, if the
externality is positive, not only will it increase q 2 itself,
but it will also increase the efficiency units of x^ and
thereby increase q 2 .
We do not consider these last two amendments to the
assumptions concerning the production function of the ext er 
nality receiving firm because first, they are not directly
associated with the objectives of this research; and
second, they would involve much more elaborate derivations
later in this chapter.

Production
Consider two industries composed of n^ and n? firms
respectively.
industry;

Industry one is the externality producing

industry two is the receiving industry.

the externality is one way.

Thus,

Firms in the same industry

are identical in terms of their production functions and
purely competitive in terms of their behavior.

Industry

output is equal to the number of firms in the industry
times the output of a firm.

Assuming only one input,

production functions for representative firms of each
industry are shown in Equation Set 3.

3)

fMq^

y-^, x x) = 0, and f 2 (q9 , y v

x^) = o

These production functions are assumed to be convex in
the region of welfare m a x i m i z a t i o n . ^
The specification of the aggregate externality identi
ties was developed in Chapter II.

The aggregate amount of

the externality produced and received in the Type I case
(large number,
n-,y

= y .

public reception)

can be expressed as

The aggregate externality identity for exter-

nalities of Type II
is n-^y^ = n 2 l 2 w '-ere

(large number,

private reception)

externality is private because

the quantity of the externality is reduced by reception.
For Type III externalities

(private reception,

small

■^^This assumption is no stronger than assuming the
existence of a competitive equilibrium given the previous
assumptions made about the production functions.
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number)

the specification is simply

that the externality

produced by a firm in industry one is necessarily received
by one and only one firm in industry two,
Type II externalities

i.e.,

y^ = y?.

that are private because of the

locational confinement of the spillover will be analysed
n—
by means of the model used for Type III e x t e r n a l i t i e s .^
In these specifications,

it is assumed that all firms

produce and receive the external effects.
notably 3aumol
avoided.

(72), allow for

However,

I externalities.
Baumol's paper.
nality,

the results

Some writers,

the externality to

be

are predictable for Type

The interested reader is directed to
For the locationallv confined exter

avoidance is an important consi ci0 2 Tcition / one*

addressed in depth in Chapters IV and V.
An additional constraint must

be included to

ensure

that in the case of negative spillovers the Type III
externality exists.

The number of firms in each industry

is assumed to be equal and limited.

That is, n-, = n ? = S,

- ^ R e c a l l the externality specification in this case:
yi _> K y 2 * Pareto optimality will require this constraint
to be solved as an equality.
K is a constant and can be
omitted from explicit consideration.
Or
The concern in this chapter is with the Pareto con 
ditions on the firms receiving and producing the external
ity.
The assumption that all firms in the two industries
are externality related is a simple method of addressing
only this point.
The inclusion of an upper limit, 3, on
the number of firms in each industry is done for logical
consistency in the negative externality case.
In the
positive externality case, firms in the two industries will
seek to locate near one another.
However, in this case the
constraint on the maxi mu m number of firms m ay be lifted.
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where S is the fixed number of firms in each industry.

A

negative Type III externality will only exist if alternative
locations are not available.

If available,

alternative

locations would allow the potential pollution receiving
firms to avoid the externality.
of such locations,
pollution.

Given a sufficient number

no firm in industry two would receive

37

Consumption
Assume there are L consumers in the economy who do
not experience directly the pollution.
of the j

th

consumer can be specified as:

U3 = U^IQ^,

where

The utility function

Q 2j, x 3j)

is the amount of the i

th

good consumed by

individual j, and "x 3 j" is the amount of the resources,
consumed.

X,

The constrained utility function of consumer

j is :

U 3 = U 3 ( •) - X . (P, Q, . + P nQ n . - P J x , . - x v )
c
u 11]
2 2j
3 3]
3j
where "x 3 j" is the initial endowment of the resource to
■VVi
the j
consumer, "P-^," "P 2 /M anc^ "^ 3 " are the market
prices of Q^, Q 2 , and X, respectively,
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that are faced

It is this aspect of the Type III case that is
mos t important in interpreting the results of this research
vis-a-vis the results of other writers.
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parametrically by the j

th

consumer,

and

A

is the

Lagrangian multiplier on the income constraint.

By m a x i 

mizing this function, we obtain the familiar result that

U

1

For the economy,

= A .P . ,
3

1

i = 1, 3.

it must be true that

Q . = ZQ . .,
1
.11
3

i = 1, 2

J

and
X = Zx., , = n, x, + n„x_ + Ex, .
• 3i
k k
2 2
• 3i
J J
3
Pareto Optimality
The large number,

public reception externality model,

which will henceforth be named Model I, has the following
constrained Pareto welfare function:

n = I
j

0).

38

(U3 (.) - g )

+ Z y .n.f1 *-)
^ x x

+ Z p.(n.q.
^
1
i x

- Z Q . •)
j 13

+ o„ (X - Z n.x. - Zx, .)
■3
. ! 1
33

+ i/j(n1 y 1 - y 2 )
38

i = l,

2

;j

= l, l

The terms toj , yj_, p, and ip are Lagrangian multipliers,
Because all firms xn each industry are identical, n-j_fi(>) =
y;ni fx (. ) ^ where n. denotes the number of firms in the i^h
3= 1
1
industry.
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The term "g^" is the utility constraint of the j
in accordance with definition of

th

consumer

Pareto welfare.

By replacing the last constraint,

the externality

identity, with ^(n-^y^ - n 2 y 2) , we have the Pareto welfare
function for large number,
not locationally confined

private externalities which are
(Model II).

Finally,

Model III

requires the substitution of <My^ ~ Y 2 ^ + 1>(S - n)

for the

last constraint and n for n^ and n 2 elsewhere in the eq u a 
tion.

Privately received,

large

number externalities

that

are locationally confined can be

analyzed by means of

Model

III.
In order to derive the first order conditions of
Pareto optimality,

the function

time setting a different
zero.

is maximized L times each

equal to one and g^ equal to

This generates a system of L(4L + 13)

for Model I.
in form;

All L sets of these equations are similar

the value of the equations may be different and,

hence a simultaneous
Pareto optimality.
consumer

equations
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solution is necessary to achieve
Maximizing the system for a typical

(holding all other consumers'

and satisfying all constraints exactly)
set of equations.

utility constant
yields the following

These equations are essentially the same

except for the partials with respect to industry size.
Hence,

the derivations are carried out for Model I only.

~^See cliff Lloyd (67, page 252) . The use of Wj and g.
to simplify the welfare maximization derivations comes fr o m -1
Baumol (72).
Specifications similar to the one used here
can be found in Schulze and d'Arge (74), Howrey and Quandt
(6 8 ), and Myers and Weintraub (71), especially with regard
to the industry size and welfare maximiz a ti on techniques.
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4)

3fi/3s. = co .U . l
j i
where

5)

= i

th

p. = 0
l

7)

3fi/3y2 = u 2 n 2 f^ -

)

9)

i

3fl/3q. = ii.n.f1 + p.n. = 0
' ^i
l l q
ll

3fl/3y^ = u^n^f^ +

8

j = 1, L

argument in U J (•)

)

6

i = 1, 3,

=

=

i = 1, 2

0

0

3fi/3x. = p . n . f 1 - p^n. =
i
l l x
3 l

3fi/3n1 = P1q 1 + '^y1 - P3x j_ + p-Lf 1 (-) = 0
2

10)

3fi/3n2 = P2^2 “ P3X 2 + 1J2 f

= ®

^

Because all L sets of equations are similar in form,
it'can be shown that the Pareto requirements on price in
the two industries hold in general and are not affected
by the income distribution.
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Moreover,

because the supply

and demand functions of consumers and firms are ho m o 
geneous of degree zero with respect to the prices of good
one, good two, and the resource
ing to Walras'
40

Law,

(i.e.,

P^, P 2 , P^)

accord

the specification of any one uniquely

This means that m the derivations to come, the choice
of the u)j=l and gj = 0 will not affect the Pareto requirements.
In fact, the same results are implicitly derived L times.
This does not mean that the Pareto "solution" is invariant
with r e s p e c t to the distribution of income, nor will relative
prices be.
Relative prices and the composition of consu mp 
tion will be invariant with respect to the distribution
of factor endowments or income if and only if all p r e 
ference functions are identically homothetic.
See
Samuelson (58).
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determines the other two.

Hence,

fixing the price of the

resource allows us to determine P^ and P 2 *
Substituting the ok

term into the first

order co n

ditions for utility maximization by the L consumers,

we

have that
11)

oj.U-?
3 1

= co.A.P.,
3 3 i

i = 1, 3,

j = 1, L.
J

Combining Equations 11 and 4 we have

12)

p. = co .U ■? = co ■A .P . ,
l
3 1
j j i

From Equations
p3

5 and

i=

1, 3,

j = 1, L .

8

= ~Pi (f f g) /

i =

1

,

2

Substituting for f^/f^j

p3 =

Pj_(d q ^ / d x ^

+

( fy /f g) ( d y ^ d x ^ } ,

Solving for the term f^/f^ from Equations

5,

6

i =

1,

,and

7

2

fyV f q1 = -[L (
p 0 n _ )/p, ]f 2/f 2
' K 2 2 / M lJ y
<3
Noting that d y 2 / d x 2 = 0 and f

2

= 1 by definition

(see page

I II- 6 ) we have

2

13)

p 3 = p 1 (dq1 / d x 1 ) - p 2 n 2 fy (dy1 / d x 1 )

14)

p 3 = p 2 (dq2 / d x 9 )

Substituting {'ijAjP^,

i = 1, 3}

from Equation 12 for

50

{p^,

i = 1, 3},

15)

cancelling u k A^, and

=P 3 / ( d q 1 / d x 1 )

16)

rewriting

+P 2n 2fy (dy 1 / d q 1 )

P2 = P3 /(dq2 /dx2)

Substituting for \jj and for {p^,

i = 1, 3} in Equations 9

and 19, and cancelling

17)

P lq l

~ (P2n 2fy )y l =

18)

p 2q 2

= P 3X 2

Equations

P 3X 1

15 and 16 can be interpreted as the m a r 

ginal cost-price equality necessary to achieve Pareto
optimality.

Equations 17 and 18 are the zero profits

conditions that ensure the appropriate number of firms
in each industry and thereby specify the point in the
marginal cost curve that yields Pareto optimality.
Equations 17 and 18 can be written in average cost form.
The derivation of the Pareto conditions for Model II
require that the constraint if;(n^y^ - n 7 y 7 ) be substituted
for

4j(n-^y^

- y2).

Equations 7 and 10 are changed to

U2n 2fy - 1'n 2 = 0

T)
10')

2

p2q 2 - (j;y2 - p3x 2 + u2f (•) = 0

This change in Equation 7 causes the n 2 term in Equations
13,

15, and 17 to fall out.

The change in Equation 10

2

causes

(p 2 ^y^y l to a PPear on t*1 0 left-hand-side of Equation
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18.

Thus,

the extra

term {P 2 ( 3<32/ 9y2 )(Y 2 / q 2 )^ appears in

Table III-l, under the average cost conditions for industry
two.
For Model III iMy^ ” Y 2 )

substituted for ip (n-^y^ - y 2 )

and "n" is substituted for n^ and n 2>
straint ip (S-n)

The additional con

is necessary for consistency.

Equations

6

and 7 become
u nf1 +
1
y

i
r

=

7 " ) l-unf2 2
y

ip

= 0.

6

")

0

.

Because n now appears in both Equations
cels and Equations

6

" and 7" it can

13 and 15 are the same in Model II.

Equations 9 and 10 become simply
2

9")

P 1q 1 +

P 2q 2

"

P 3X 1 ~

P 3X 2 + y l f

2

+ y2f

+

= 0.
The value of the Lagrangian multiplier <p is the imputed
value of the scarce locations n, in Model III.
Table III-l summarizes these conditions for all three
models.
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Recall that Type I is the Pigovian case and Type

III is the Coasian case.

However,

the marginal cost con

ditions in all three models are essentially identical.
is the average cost requirements that delineate the d i f 
ferences in the results.

The equation numbers from th,e text are shown in
parentheses in the table.

It
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Table III-l
Pareto Efficiency Conditions for
Externalities of Type I, II, and III

Model I
Industry Two

Industry One
Marginal
Cost

15)

P 1 = p 3 / ( d q 1 / d x 1)

16)

P 2 = P 3 / ( d q 2 / d x 2)

- P 2 n 2 (3q 2 / 9 y 2 ) ( d y ^ d q ^
Average
Cost

17)

18)

P x = P 3 x1 /q1

P.

= P 3 x2/qp

p 2 n 2 O q 2 / 3 y 2 ) ( y ^/ ^)

Model II
Industry Two

Industry One
Marginal
Cost

P 1 = P 3/' (dcl i / d x i)

P 2

= p 3 / ( d(39/d x 2)

- P 2 ( d q 2/ d y 2 ) (dy1 / d q 1 )
Average
Cost

P 1 = P 3X l;/ql
- P 2 0 q 2/ 3 y 2)

P2

P 3X 2 //q2.

+ p 2 ^°q 2//dy2) (Y2^ q 2}

Model III
Industry Two

Industry One
Marginal
Cost

Px = P 3 /(dq1 /dx1)

P 2

= P 3'/ (d % 2 /'d x 2^

- P 2 (3.q2/3 y 2) (dy1 / d q 1 )
Average
Cost*

P 1 = P 3X l/ g l
+ ( 0 - ( P 2 q 2 - P 3 x 2))/qi

P 2 = P 3X 2/ q 2
+( 0 -(P 1 q 1 - P 3 x 1 ) ) / q 2

*This condition is best stated as a zero profits requiremen
0 = 0 , where 0 is imputed rent on each locati<
.E, (P .q . - P 0 x.)
i = l v l^i
3 i
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The marginal cost conditions in all three models show
that the externality producing industry should explicitly
recognize the effect of the externality and the receiving
industry should merely take the externality as a given.
For industry one, marginal cost of q^ should be the addi
tional cost of the resource necessary to produce an add i
tional unit of

plus the additional cost of producing q ^

caused by an additional unit of q-^.

In Model I, P^/(dq^/dx^)

is the additional cost of the resource;
(dy^/dq^)
of q 2 »

~ ^ 2 n 2 (^ 2 //^

2

^

is the additional cost imposed on the production

For industry two,

there is no explicit accounting

for the effect of the externality.

(dq 2 / d x 2 ) is the

additional cost of the resource necessary to produce an
additional unit.of q 2 •

However,

the term

(dq 2 / d x 2 ^

implicitly reflects the effect of the externality,

as d i s 

cussed in the third section of this chapter.
The average cost conditions for the three models
differ significantly.

In Model I, firms in the exter na l

ity producing industry must,

in their average cost,

explic

itly account for the effect of the externality on the
receiving industry.
the term - P 2 n 2 ( <^2 /

42
The " p r i c e " * of the externality is
^’

T^is term times the amount of

the externality should be an actual payment made by each
firm in industry one if a Pigovian tax is used to achieve
optimality.

42

On the other hand,

no explicit accounting

This price is positive or negative depending on the
negative or positive sign of the externality, (dq 2 / d y 2 ) .
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should be made by the firms in industry two.
phrase Baumol

(72, page 312),

To par a

the level of the exte r

nality acting through the marginal and average costs of
the firms will optimally delimit the number of firms in
the receiving industry.

Hence,

the results of Model I

are consistent with the Pigovian taxing strictures di s
cussed by Baumol.
Alternatively,

Model II shows a case where the

externality receiving industry must account explicitly
for the externality.

The term P 2 (3q 2 / 3 y 2 ) appears in

the average cost requirements of both the producing and
receiving firms.

This term times the amount of the ext er 

nality for each firm and summed over all the firms in
each industry constitutes a transfer from one industry to
the other;

i.e.,

n ^ ( P 9 (3q 2 / 3 y 2 )y^)

because n^y^ = n 2 ^ 2 ’

T^ e direction

on the sign of the externality.
negative,

= n 0 (P2 (3q2 / 3 y 2 )y 2 )
the transfer depends

If the externality is

industry one pays industry two;

industry two pays industry one.

if positive,

This result is identical

to the case of a normal good that is produced as a joint
product and used as an input in another production process.
This result is consistent with the Pigovian tax strictures
suggested by Meade and Gould.

Recall that Meade argued

that a tax and subsidy scheme was necessary as opposed to
a unilateral tax

(assuming a negative externality) .

In Models I and II the average cost condition dete r
mines how many firms should exist in each industry.

The
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average cost conditions determines where along the appro
priately specified marginal cost curve each firm should
operate.-

Industry quantity demanded divided by the quantity

produced by one firm yields the optimal industry size in
terms of the number of firms.
In Model III industry size in the sense of the number
of firms is fixed at S.

This specification is used because

pollution will not exist otherwise.

Thus,

the average cost

conditions are not important in determining the number of
firms.
While the average cost conditions for Model III are
unimportant as a condition of efficiency, they are descr ip 
tive about the nature of the Coasian externality problem.
These average cost conditions states together as a zero
profit constraint show the value of

as the rent on each
2

location.
P 3 x i ) = (p.

These conditions are best stated as

I (P.q.
i=l
1 1

-

If the marginal cost conditions are satisfied,

and if the location constraint is binding,
is a residual.

(n = S ) , the rent

The value of i is the value of the increase

in welfare if S were increased.

Its monetary value can be

computed by taking the difference between the total
revenues and resource cost for both the externality pro 
ducing and receiving firms at one location where the m a r 
ginal conditions are satisfied.
It will be shown in Chapter V that the marginal cost
conditions from Model III imply that the two firms must
jointly maximize profit.

If pollution cannot be avoided,
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the average cost efficiency conditions show that the two
involved firms make profit equal to cp.
nomous,

as Coase illustrated,

If they are auto 

it matters not which one has

the property right to pollution because a rent,
exist.

i, must

A payment can flow in either direction without

affecting efficiency.

However, Model III does not do

justice to the Coasian case because the externality speci
fication assumes that pollution must occur if production
does.

Results consistent with the Coasian case are only

achieved if the location constraint is binding.
If a Type II externality exists because the number
of locations is fixed,
by Model III.

the efficiency conditions are given

The full implication of these results

will be explored in Chapter V.

However,

the implication

from the results obtained thusfar indicates that both the
pollution receiver and producer should pay.

Notice that

such a tax scheme is not part of the Pigovian tradition.
In fact Baumol makes a point of criticizing C o a s e 's sug
gestion that possibly such a tax might be necessary.

Coase

and Buchanan both thought that such a tax might be appro
priate but were unsure.

The reader may wonder whether a positive payment is
always possible in either direction.
This is a question of
the possibility of corner solutions.
Such questions are
extensively addressed in the next two chapters.
As a pre
view, it can be shown that the payment will always equal
the difference between total revenues and resource cost
for the firm making the payment.
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Summary
This chapter has defined the externality problem in
terms of the specification of the production functions of
the firms in the economy.
externality is considered:
external effects.

For simplicity only a one way
firms either produce or receive

For the producing firm,

is a joint product of its output;

the externality

for the receiving firm,

the externality is like another input except that the firm
may not be able to control the amount.
In order to consider the aggregate effect of the exte r 
nality,

three models were used.

These models are specified

in such a way as to conform to the definitions of Type I,
II, and III externalities.

The Pareto welfare conditions

of these models were derived and shown to conform with the
policy suggestions of both the Pigovian and Coasian
traditions.
Models I and II show results consistent with those of
Baumol, Meade,

and Gould.

The imposition of a Pigovian tax

is an appropriate technique for achieving efficiency.
tax differs in the two cases.
be unilateral;

The

In Model I such a tax should

in Model II a tax/subsidy scheme is nec es 

sary.
The welfare conditions derived from Model III can be
shown to imply that profit maximization alone will achieve
optimality.

A negative externality will only exist if

locations are scarce.

This scarcity calls for a rent that

means a payment between two autonomous firms can go in
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either direction.
arguments.

This result is consistent with Coase's

This result also implies that the appropriate

tax in the large number case where the externality is
locationally confined is one where all parties pay.
In the following chapters, Model III will be amended
to more closely reflect the conditions of the Coasian
externality problem.

Specifically,

the model is extended

to allow for the existence or avoidance of pollution at
any particular site.

With this extended model

it will be

shown how the rents, which are the essence of the Coasian
Theorem,
mix.

adjusts in order to achieve the optimal industry

C HAPTER IV
PARETO EFFICIENCY
IN THE SMALL NUMBER,

PRIVATE RECEPTION CASE

Introduction
The results of the previous chapter indicate that the
Pigovian and Coasian arguments can be reconciled.

The

Pareto conditions of Model I and II are appropriate for
certain kinds of Pigovian problems;

the taxing policies

are consistent with those proposed by other writers.
III shows results which,

although simplified,

Model

are app ro 

priate when locational restriction of the external effects
occurs.

This chapter extends the analysis of site-specific

externalities by allowing for the externality to be avoided
at some locations.

The extension of the analysis to

include the existence of pollution at some locations and
not at others greatly increases the application of the
model.
The site-specific externality analyzed by Model III
gave rise to the Pareto welfare result that economic
rents exist if locations are scarce.

This finding has

immediate policy implications that are consistent with the
Coase Theorem.
are:

1

)

Specifically,

these policy implications

government intervention is not necessarily when

technological externalities exist if the firms maximize
59
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profit;

2

) definitions of property rights will only decide

the payments going to various landlords and will not affect
the quantity or mix of production;

and,

3)

the property

right definition that occurs through governmental inaction
is as efficient as any other;

Pareto optimality is achieved

even if property rights are given by defalut to the p o l 
luter through government inaction.

If the Coase Theorem

is true, government interest in defining property rights
is justified only when equity is a concern.
The results obtained from Model III in the last
chapter show that a shadow price on each location is
necessary when locations are scarce.

44

This

has the economic interpretation of a rent.
the Coase Theorem hinges on two points.
mic rent must exist m

shadow price
The proof of

First,

the case of pollution.

the rent at each location is a variable.
the industry output levels vary.
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this econoSecond, '

It changes as

This second point is the

key to the Coase Theorem ignored by the current litera
ture .
In order to develop the proof of the Coase Theorem,
this chapter reexamines the Pareto efficiency conditions
for Coasian externality problems.

The constraint on

44

In other words, where the constraint on the maximum
number of locations is binding.
45

We are for the most part concerned only with ne g a 
tive externalities.
When the theory is fully developed
for these, the case of positive externalities becomes
transparent.

locations is modified to allow for pollution at some locations and not at others.

.

This modification brings the model

more in line wit h the examples and applications of the
theorem used by Coase and others.

In many of the Type III

externality cases one finds that firms in the industries
involved in the externality do not always locate near
one another.

In other words,

some firms avoid the p o l 

lution problem while others are not so lucky.

This chapter

expands the welfare model to include this phenomenon and
derives the Pareto conditions.

In the next chapter the

competitive mecha ni sm is shown to generate these e f f i 
ciency properties.

The Relevance of the Small Number Setting
The small number case of externality relationships is
relevant whenever participants can reach a mutually b e n e 
ficial solution to the spillover problem if such a solution
exists.

Coase

(60) describes several examples that are

consistent with the definition of the Type III externality.
The confectioner versus the doctor,

the cocoa-nut fibre

weaver versus the sulphate of ammonia producer,

and a

brewer versus an innkeeper are all cases of firms int er 
locked in externality problems having bargainable solu
tions .
An initial reaction to these examples is that they are
insignificant in terms of the relevant industries as a
whole.

Isolated cases of externality are not likely to have

a significant impact on the price in any market because,
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in a competitive market,

firms are price takers.

It is

unusual that all of Coase's examples seem to be loca
tional anomolies which are not characteristic of the p a r 
ticular industries as a whole.

However,

the Coase Theorem

does indeed apply even in these cases and its application
is far from trivial.

An important aspect of the theorem

developed in this and the following chapter is that firms
should locate and relocate based on the external effects
produced and received.
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In this context the Coase Theorem

may imply that no pollution should exist at any one or,
fact,

all locations.

in

Hence, Coase's examples are co n

sistent with his theorem.
Moreover,

there are two examples where the small

number case has industry-wide implications.

The first is

the famous case of the apple and bees externality used by
Meade

(52).

Certainly here we have two industries

47

where the externality relationship is industry-wide.
The second case deals with the shellfish industry.

Com

mercial clamming in the estuaries of the southeastern
United States using mechanical harvesting devices may result
in externalities that influence the production of other

46

This result can be extended to firms of multiple
industries, so that the externality relationship of any
firm in one industry may not be exactly the same as that of
any other firm in that industry.
This point is addressed
in Chapter VI.
47

At least, many other types of agricultural endeavors
require the service of bees.
See especially, Cheung (73)
and Johnson (73).
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commercial seafood.

Specifically,

the interdependencies

between oystering and clamming embody properties of the
small number case.

Because most clamming and oystering

occurs in the same areas,
significant m

the externality relationship is

terms of industry production.

48

Another example of the presence of Type III ext er 
nalities is the emergence of zoning ordinances.
ma ny of these regulations pertain to consumers,

Although
the wide

v ariety of commercial zones suggest significant externalities of location among firms as well.

49

An obvious

question is whether the zoning ordinances are a necessary
means to achieve efficiency or are merely rent transfers
obtained through the political market.

The Extended Specification
Model III from the last chapter is essentially the
same here.

The externality is a "one-on-one"

relationship between two firms.

50

locational

If the externality

48

It has been pointed out by Johnson (73) that any
externalities which exist in the bee industry are e ff e c 
tively internalized.
Likewise, Maloney et. al. (77) claim
that the oyster-clam problem is internalized if mark et
processes are permitted to function.
It is the purpose of
this paper to prove why mar ke t forces will necessarily
internalize externality in these cases.
49

Shopping centers are a good example of private
market internalization.
"^This simplification can be easily modified without
changing the results.
Such a modification is necessary
when considering the application of Model III to Type II
externalities.
This discussion is deferred, in part, to
Chapter V I ,
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effect produced by a firm in industry one is received by
a firm in industry two,
firm.

However,

it is received by only one such

there is no argument in the production

function that requires a firm in one industry to locate in
the proximity of a firm in the other industry.

Thus,

Model III can be simply extended to allow for avoidance
of the externality.

The aggregate externality constraint

used here will include isolated as well as joint production
of the two goods.

Still assuming that there are S loca

tions and two sites at each, we now allow for one site to
remain vacant.

Whereas in Chapter III the number for

firms in the two industries was assumed equal,
longer the case.
industry one,

this is no

Some locations may house only firms in

some only firms in industry two,

may house a firm from both industries.

and some

However,

only one

firm from an industry may produce at a l o c a t i o n . ^
Although the Type III externality was developed in
the last chapter,

a review of that discussion in light of

the extended model may be enlightening.

As we will see,

the extension implies efficient outcomes that may include
pollution at some locations and not at others.

In fact,

Even though there are two sites, only one is a v a i l 
able to each industry.
This assumption is equivalent to
assuming pollution may or ma y not exist at a location.
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as in Coase's examples,

efficiency m ay require that no

firm actually receives pollution.
In this model,

52

the private nature of a Type III

externality is embodied in the "one-on-one"
nality production and reception.
what another receives;

hence,

nature of exte r

One firm produces exactly

y-^ = y ^

That this is a

private externality situation is obvious for positive
externalities.

When a firm in industry two receives the

effects of a positive externality from a firm in industry
one,
fits.

no other firm in industry two can receive those bene
The externality is private because it is excludable.

Symmetrically,

if the externality is negative,

the avoid

ance of the harm by one firm in industry two prohibits
such avoidance by another firm.
externalities,
assumed finite.

In the case of negative

potential locations for all firms are
As discussed previously,

infinite no externality would exist.
externality is costly,
rule,

if they were

Because a negative

and depending on the liability

entrants into one or the other industry will always

wish to avoid the externality in order to maximize profit.
The existence of an externality requires that the demand
for sites by firms in both industries mus t be so great

In the case of the doctor and the confectioner, the
appropriate social choice was not between doctoring and
candy in the aggregate, but between doctoring or candy
making or both at that location.
Coase implies this but
additional emphasis and specific modeling is necessary
to show why.
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that firms from the two industries are forced to locate
"next" to each other.
Consider Figure IV-1 and the following scenario.
There are S locations.

At each location there is a site

for a firm from both industry one and industry two.

Assume

firms in industry one fill their sites from the left, while
firms in industry two enter from the right.

If an ext er 

nality producing firm and a receiving firm locate at "j",
a negative spillover is received.

Location "j" will be

occupied by a firm from both industries if and only if
locations

1

tions j + 1

...

j- 1

contain industry one firms,

... S contain industry two firms.

definition of a relevant negative spillover,

and loca
By the

the sum of

the total profits of the externality related firms at
location "j" is less than the sum of the total profits
of an isolated firm in industry one and an isolated firm
in industry two.

Such overlapping

(location by a firm at

a site where it will either produce or receive a negative
externality)

will be avoided if possible.

Only when there is scarcity of locations will the
profit maximizing behavior of the firms in the two i nd u s 
tries allow a negative externality to exist.

In this case,

whe n a firm in industry two locates away from a firm in
industry one,

it avoids pollution but denies some other firm

FIGURE IV-1

1

j+ 1

INDUSTRY ONE

INDUSTRY TWO

in industry two a pollution-free location.

53

The site

specific nature of the externality makes it private.

Extended Pareto Efficiency
Results From Model III
In this section the aggregate externality constraint
for Model III are extended to include the possibility
of isolated firms in both industries as discussed above.
The number of locations in the economy is fixed at S.
At each location there are two sites.
firm of each industry may locate there.

However,

only one

Even though the

production functions of all firms in the same industry
are identical,

the externality received by isolated firms

in industry two is zero.

Also,

the effect on social w e l 

fare of the externality produced by isolated firms in
industry one is zero.

The Pareto welfare function to be

. .
. 54
maximized is:
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As previously noted, for expositional purposes the
externality is assumed to be "one-on-one."
This a s s u m p 
tion could be modified so that many producing firms and
many receiving firms could be affected, as long as the
number was small enough to allow for bargaining.
Clearly
if an infinite number of producing firms could be asso 
ciated with an infinte number of receiving firms at each
location there would be no negative externality because
there would be no scarcity of alternative locations.
54

The terms w j , y^,

p^, (p, and a ^ are the Lagrangian

multipliers.
The resource not sold by each consumer has
been relabeled as x . for notational clarity.
^J

Four types of firms can be identified:
Twos produce and receive the externality,

Firm Ones and

respectively;

Firms Threes are isolated producers in industry one;
Fours are isolated producers in industry two.
EI+n . f 1 (-)
i=l 1

Firm

Thus

is the production constraint for the economy.

Because a Firm One and Firm Two share a location,

n^ =

and the location constraint for the economy can be expressed
as S -

S4n . .
i=2

The Pareto welfare function,

Q, can be looked upon as

a non-linear program where
n 2

+

+

113

1I4

< S.

According to the Kuhn-Tucker conditions either
(S - S n . ) - 0
i
or
cf>

=

0 ,

where (j) is the Lagrangian multiplier on the constraint.
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The implication of this condition is clear when the partials
of ft with respect to each n^ are examined.
{P^,

i = 1, 3} for {p^,

Substituting

i = 1, 3} as in Chapter II we

, 55
find:

1

)

9ft/ 3n1 =

9ft/3n2 =

52 (Uif i (-) + P ^ i
i= l
9ft/9n^ =

+ P i^ 3

- P3 X i} “ * =

“ P3X

3

“ ^ =

9ft/9n4 = U 4 f 4 (•) + P 2 q 4 ~ P 3 x 4 - >p =

If (p is positive

(locations are scarce)

0

0

0

the value of

<p can be interpreted as the Pareto efficiency shadow price
on each location.

The economic interpretation of this

shadow price is that of a rent on each location.
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The economic interpretation of the results of this
model center on the term <p, the rent on each location.
Each location has three alternative uses.
be produced,
two produced.
tively.

only good one can be produced,

Both goods can
or only good

Call these activities A, B, and C, respec

Equation Set 1 shows that any or all of these

activities may be Pareto efficient at the S available

55
As was the case in the previous models

{p^, i=l,3}

can ultimatelv be set equal to {P-, i=l,3} because all lo .A .
M
i
3 3
terms cancel.
Also the marginal cost conditions for a
Pareto maximum are the same as those for Model III, Chapter
II, with the addition that P. = P-,/(dq./ d x .) , i = 3, 4.
I"-^
56

The rent on a location is collected from both sites.
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locations.

In other words,

all S locations,
activity C.

only activity A may occur at

only activity B at all locations,

Also,

or only

activity A ma y occur at some locations

and activities B or C at the others,

etc.

Equation Set 1 (disregarding the terms involving
implicit production functions)

the

shows the rent equality

condition for each location allowing for all possible
alternative welfare maxima assuming the other first order
conditions are satisfied.

The model allows for isolated

production or joint production of the two goods so long as
the difference between total revenues and costs equals
rent,

<p.

the

If the difference between total revenues and

costs for the alternative uses of a location all yield <p,
all those activities occur at separate locations at the
welfare maximum.

If for any potential use of a location,

the difference between revenues and costs is less than 1,
that use efficiently occurs at no location.

In other words,

d) must be equal at each location and has the value of the
difference between total revenues and costs at each loca
tion regardless of the activity that occurs

there.

The

relative prices of good one and good two and the effect of
the externality may rule out one or two of the three pos 
sible activities.

We can think of an inefficient activity

as one where the difference between total revenues and costs

72
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are not enough to cover d .

An efficient activity is one

that generates enough revenues to cover the resource cost
and the rent.
Intuitively,

the rent.is a measure of the social cost

of not using a location in the most efficient manner.

This

result can be shown by means of the following scenario.
If expansion of industry two causes an isolated producer
of good one to become a joint producer, what is the "loss"
to society?
the output of

It is the

difference between the value of

good one by an isolated producer and the

value of the output of good one by a joint producer,

P lq 3 " P lq l
plus the difference in the cost of resources expended,
P 3X 1 “ P 3X 3
These two terms express the potential decrease in the pro
duction of

and the potential increase in cost.

The "gain" from such a move is the value of good
two produced less the cost of good two,
P 2q 2 “ P 3X 2
The move will
P 2q 2

increase society's welfare if
" P 3X 2 > P lq 3 “ P lq l “ P 3X 1 + P 3X 3

which is to say,

Technically, if the difference between total reve
nues and costs is not equal to <p, the difference is made up
by y-j_f1 (*).
This term is a measure of how close the activity
comes to making the efficient solution.
Because n. is,
then, equal to zero, the aggregate production-consumption
identity is fulfilled.

73

2)

Hence,

' E*

1=1

^P iq i

P 3X i ) > P lq 3

P 3X 3

if the profitability of joint production

(left hand

side of Equation 2) is greater than independent production
of good one

(right hand side of Equation 2),

undertaken,

but not if it is less.

it should be

These conditions show that when there are alternative
uses of each location the marginal welfare effect of each
use mus t be identical.

Industry output adjustments can be

thought of as occurring as in the scenario above to achieve
a mov emen t to the optimal solution.
tion isolated production of good one,
of good two,

joint production,

At the optimal solu
isolated production

or any combination of these

three may occur at the S locations.

Summary
This chapter has developed an industry structure for
the small number,

private externality assuming that loca

tional confinement is the delimiter of the external effects.
This structure allows for isolated production or the av o i d 
ance of the externality.

The Pareto efficiency conditions

show that such isolation,

indeed, may exist at the optimal

solution.

For a negative externality to exist at all there

must be a scarcity of locations.

If such scarcity exists,

these uses of the locations that yields the max imu m d i f f e r 
ence between revenues and costs are efficient.

This d i f 

ference can be considered a rent on each location.

For the Coase Theorem to hold it is necessary that the
behavior of profit maximizi ng firms embody these extended
Model III results.

In the next chapter the behavior of

profit ma xim izi ng firms and the industry adjustment based
on such behavior are explored.

At that time further co n 

sideration is given to the alternative,

efficient eq u i 

libria introduced in the last section of this chapter.

CHAPTER V
THE COASE THEOREM

Introduction
The Coase Theorem holds that in the case of zero b a r 
gaining costs an externality will be efficiently .internal
ized by the affected parties with out government intervention.
Implied by the theorem is that the rule of liability has
no effect on the allocation of resources.

The purpose of

this chapter is to show how the competitive adjustment
mechan ism does achieve an efficient allocation of resources
regardless of the liability rule.
From the last chapter,

Pareto optimality requires a

rent to exi st on each location if a negative externality is
experienced in the economy.

This rent must be equal at all

locations and absorb ail of the profit regardless of the
type of production carried out there.

This chapter shows

how the competitive adjustment process acting on these
rents reassigns production at each location until efficiency
obtains.

Because a rent must exist for efficiency in the

case of pollution,

the liability rule is inconsequential.

In the Coasian case,

all locations are homogeneous

even though they may have different uses.

The different

uses allowed for are equivalent to the existence or not
75
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of pollution at a location.

cq

The Pareto conditions on

rents indicate that the potential for avoidance of the
externality at some locations is just as important as its
proper internalization v/here it occurs.
The purpose of this chapter is to show how the com
petitive market me ch a n i s m fulfills the Pareto efficiency
conditions.

In order to do this,

the actions of a profit

maximizing firm that produces both good one and good two
are shown to fulfill the Pareto conditions v/here po l l u 
tion occurs.

At the same time,

the analysis of the joint

profit maximiz ing firm is developed in a way that can be
used to compare the relative profitability of isolated
and joint production.

Next,

a distinction between rent

and economic profit is made in order to describe the co m
petitive adjustment process.

Rent is the payment to the

scarce factor of production locations.

Profit is the p a y 

ment for the short run mi sal loca ti on of resources.

The

process of industry expansion and contraction is first
developed in the case of no external effects.
definitions of rent and profit are explored,

After the
the case of

a negative externality is presented.

-’8 'rhus the simplifying assumption that two firms of
one industry can not produce at one location is made.
T.he
model only allows for isolated production of either good,
which is a situation of no pollution, or joint production
wherein pollution occurs.
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Joint Profit Maximization
Assume one firm maximizes the profit of simultaneously
producing both good one and good two.

The constrained

profit function is:
2

it = -2 ^{Piq i - P 3 x i +

6

if1 (-)} + ■M y 1 ~ V 2 )

The last constraint can be substituted into the production
function f^(.) ;

and y-, can be relabeled as v.

The first

order conditions can be expressed as:^'

1

)

2)

P-j^ = P 3 / ( d q 1 / d x 1) - P 7 (3q 0 /3y) (dy/dq1)

P 2 = P 3 / ( d q 9 / d x 2)

These expressions are identical to the marginal cost
requirements for Pareto optimality from Model III where
the externality exists.
Equation 1 can be rewritten as:

la)

P 1 - ? 3 / ( d q 1 / d x 1) = - P 2

(3 q 2 / 3 Y ) (dy/db-^)

The left hand side of Equation la is a typical priceminus-marginal-cost expression for good one and is the
change in profits due to a change in good one without
considering the externality.

The right hand side of

Equation la is the effect on profits due to the effect
on q 2 .
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Important in the derivation of Equation 1 is the
fact that y and
are joint products.
Hence, -f^ =

fqdqi/dxi + fydy/dxi*

The two sides of Equation la can be integrated
yield total profit e x p r e s s i o n s . 0 ^1

Thus,

dq^ = /P 1 d q 1 - / {P 3 / ( d q 1 / d x 1 ) } d q ]_ = P
C (q^)

to

/ {P ^ ” ^ 3 / (dq^/dx^)}
- C (q.^ , where

is the total cost of producing q-, from x-^.

The profit

resulting from the production of good one can be defined
as it1 = P^q^ - C (q^) , where q^ is determined from the solu 
tion of Equations 1 and 2.

Likewise,

the profit resulting

from the production of good two is r 2 = - /{P 2 OQt/Sy)
(dy/dq^) }dq^ = k - D t q ^ q ^ q ^ ,

where D ^ ,

q 0 )q 1 is the

value of the damage imposed on the production of good two
by the production of good one,
integ rat ion.0^-

and k is the constant of

The values of D(q^, q 9) and k are dependent

on the level of q 2 determined from the solution of Equation
2.

If q^ = 0, k is the level of profit made by the isolated

production of good two.

The shape of

the relationship of x^ to q^, which,

tt 1

is determined by

by assumption,

is

characterized by increasing and then decreasing returns to
.

The shape of ft2 is determined by the relationship of y

to q^ and to q 9 .

By assumption,

the negative externality's

effect increases at an increasing rate.

For simplicity, we

assume that y = qj_.
In order to relate these total profit functions to
each other and to the marginal profit functions from which

a

n

This approach is used in Gifford

C1

(74)

and Maloney

By assumption of the nature of the production
function there is no constant of integration in the co n
struction of tt 1 .

(77)
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they are derived,

it is enlightening to show the equality

from Equation la as a tangency of

tt

1

and

ir2 .

To accomplish

this we simply invert tt’1 and measure the level of tt1 in the
opposite direction of it2 along the vertical axis.
bringing this inverted
tangency results.
Point U, Panel A,

i t 1

By

curve down onto the rr2 curve,

the

Such a graph is shown in Figure V-l.
is the appropriate tangency.

From this graph not only do we see the level of joint
profits,

but also the level of profit resulting from iso

lated production of each good.
the distance 0.0_
1 ^

In Figure V-l, Panel A,

is the maximum nrofit from producing both

good one and good two;

the distance ^ 2 ^ 4

profit from producing only good two;

2's t^ie m a x inium

the distance

0 ^ 3

->-s

the maxi mum profit from producing only good one.
Figure V-2 shows the decline in the profit levels as
price falls:

the dashed-line curves show the post price-

decline profit levels.
the

tt 1

In other words,

as P^ decreases,

function is compressed in a horizontal fashion and

rotates upward about point 0^.

Profit falls,

as does the

profit maximizing quantity of good one if produced in
isolation.

As V 2 declines,

m 2 simply drops d o w n . ^ 2

such a shift in either curve,
onto

tt2

tt 1

After

must be brought back down

until a tangency similar to point U, Figure V-l,

Panel A, again occurs.

Hence,

after a price change,

ro
The vertical distance between the old and new
curves will be everywhere equal if 92q 7/3y3q2 = 0.

the
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FIGURE V-l
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Panel B
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FIGURE V-2
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relationship of the distances

0

^0

2

j> ® 2 R 4 ' an<^ ^ 1 ^ 3

c^ an<le s -^^

The relative profitability of these three activities forms
the basis of the industry adjustment mec ha ni sm in the case
of externalities.

Industry Adjustment:

No Externality

As in the Pareto welfare model of the last chapter,
consider an economy having only S locations at which the
firms of the two industries may produce.
no externality,
location.

In the case of

assume only one firm can produce at each

Again assume that there are no costs associated

with relocation of firms.

Also,

the S locations in the

economy require no mainte na nce and they are homogeneous.
While locations and the input x are both resources for the
economy as a whole,

they are not substitutes

for the firm.

One firm only can operate one s i t e . 64
In order to begin the industry adjustment,

allow

industry one to expand its output by expanding the number
of firms until the excess profit of each firm is zero.
Firms in industry one occupy n^ locations.

Now allow

firms in industry two to begin production.

Note that second order conditions can be investi
gated by examining the relationship O 2 P-4 y 0 ^ 2 t ® 1 R 3 '
1R 3 —
:L °2R 4 must
true for the second order con
ditions of^joint profit max imization to be met.
6^In other words, the function f 1 (-) is applicable to
one site only.
Also, for the economy, output is a linearly
homogeneous function of the two resources, sites and x.
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If the profit from the production of good two falls
to zero before all S sites are occupied,
scarce and rent is zero.

locations are not

If all sites are occupied,

i.e.,

n 2 = S - n'^, and if the profit of the firms in industry
t;^o is positive,

locations are scarce and a rent will arise.

Figure V-3 depicts the allocation of the sites at this point.
The profit of a firm in industry two

(tt2) is positive,

the profit of a firm in industry one

(tt 1 ) is zero,

rent at all
A new

and

locations is zero.
firm will enter industry two because of the

excess profits.

In order to enter,

the firm m u s t pay one

0

of the landlords of the n ^ sites some portion of the
Because the rent is currently zero,

this payment,

tt

2

.

s, may

be arbitrarily small.
When the industry two firm drives the industry one
firm out of

business, it causes a

in industry

one.

Standard theory tells us the

good one and, hence,

the net revenue

cost of the resource x ) ^
rises.

reduction in

the output
price of

(revenue minus the

Q f the firms in industry one

Under the normal assumptions of competition,

the

actions of one firm have an imperceptible effect on price.
But as more firms enter industry two because of the excess
profits,

the result is observable.

Figure V-4 shows the reallocation of sites that
results in a change in the net revenue levels.

The number

5
Net 'revenue is identical to profit only if the rent
on the location is zero.
6
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FIGURE V-3
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FIGURE V-4
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of sites occupied by firms in industry one has fallen from
n^ to n^-.

The net revenue of the firms in industry one

grows because of the reduction in output resulting from
the displacement of firms in industry one.

However,

this

net revenue will not be kept by the industry one firms.
Instead it is paid to the landlords of the sites at which
they produce.

Moreover,

the rent paid by a firm in industry

two will also equal this amount.
The net revenue of the firm in industry one is in
this case the opportunity cost of all locations.

Competi

tion among the landlords will drive the rent to this
level.

A firm in industry two can always relocate to a

site occupied by a firm in industry one by offering to
pay e more than this amount.

A landlord can always offer

a site for £ less and induce a different firm to move in.
Competition will force £ to approach zero and the rent at
all sites to approach the net revenue of the least p r o 
fitable firm.
As this process unfolds,
rent and profit develops.
locations.

the distinction between

Rene is the payment for scarce

Its value is the lowest net revenue of all

firms producing.

The value of the rent is determined by

relocating the existing firms in the two industries.
Assuming that the industry output levels remain constant,
competition for the scarce locations determines the rent.
Firms will continue to relocate so long as rents are not
equal.

Excess profit can then be computed as the difference
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between net revenue and rent.

Mew firms will continue

to enter the m a rk et so long as excess profits are positive.
The terms R 1 and R 2 can be defined as net revenue
for firms in industry one and two,
industry adjustment occurs,
inin

(R1, R 2) .

respectively.

the rent,

As the

(j), is equal to the

Profit can then be defined as

tt 1

-

r.1 - j

and tt2 = R 2 - j).
As in the standard competitive model,
industry with positive profit expands.
scarce locations,

output of the

In the case of

the expansion of the industry experienc

ing positive profit causes the contraction of the other
industry as one location changes
one good to the other.

from the production of

The joint industry equilibrium

occurs when excess profits are sero,
At this point the rent equals
in both industries,

i.e.,

r 1 = s2 =

0

.

the net revenue of the firms

and the net revenue of the firms at

all locations is equal.
The importance of the distinction between rent and
profit is simply that profits are caused by short run
resources m i s a l l o c a t i o n .

They mirror the forces at work

to change the output of the two industries.

Those forces

cause an expansion of the industry experiencing positive
profits.

Rent,

on the other hand,

reflects the scarcity

of sites and measures the opportunity cost to each firm of
a location given the current allocation of resources.
Rent is the maximum payment attainable by the landlord,
resulting from the exchange of sites by two firms.

The
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computation of rent assum.es that the output levels of the
two industries remain constant.
may be at work simultaneously.

Obviously,

these processes

The distinction is drawn

in order to clearly identify the equilibrating mechanism.

Industry Adjustment:

Negative Externality

Nov; let us assume that the production of both goods
may occur at one location but that in so doing a negative
externality occurs.

This pollution causes the cost of

producing good two to increase.
tions and either good one,
duced at each.

Note,

There are still S loca

good two, or both can be p r o 

however,

that two firms of the same

industry cannot locate at one site.
Using the same scenario as in the non-pollution case,
allow the number of firms in industry one to initially
expand until the profit from the production of good one
is zero.

Then allow firms to enter industry two until all

S locations are filled.

Scarcity of locations is evidenced

by positive profits made by the firms in industry two
when all locations are filled.

At this point rents are

still zero.
The relative profitability of the different potential
activities at each site can be examined by means of the
graphical analysis developed earlier in this chapter.

The

net revenue made by the isolated producers of good two
is termed R “ ; the net revenue made by the isolated producers
of good one is termed R 3; R 1 + R 2 is the net revenue from
the joint profit maximizing production of both goods.
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Figure V-5 shows the situation where R 3 = 0, R 4 > 0, and
R 1 + R 2 > 0 even though joint production of the two goods
does not occur.

Recall that positive net revenue from the

production of good one is measured downward from point

0

^;

positive net revenue from the production of good two is
measured upward from point

0

9.
(Z C

Returning to our scenario,

as drawn,

from isolated good two production,
0_R. .
2 4

the profit

R 4, is the distance

Because this is greater than the net revenue from

either isolated good one production,
duction,

a ^3-rrri w i H

O-^R^, or joint pr o

enter industry two and drive

out a firm from industry one.

This occurs by means of the

new industry two firm paying an arbitrarily small amount
of R 4 to the landlord of an existing isolated good one
producer.

At this point a rent,

trarily small.

£, exists albeit arbi

All firms will be forced to pay the rent

because of the scarcity of locations and competition for
them.
As more firms enter industry two as isolated p r o 
ducers,

the net revenue functions of all firms shift.

The

net revenue from the production of good one increases and
that from the production of good two falls.

Assume that

the magnitude of these shifts occurs as depicted in
Figure V - 6 .

Also assume that isolated good one production

Remember profit is equal to net revenue only if
rent is zero.
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FIGURE V-5
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FIGURE V - 6
$

R
0

R
R
0

4
1

2

3
2

92

still exists at some locations.,

Because the net revenue

of isolated good two production still exceeds both joint and
isolated good one production,
two as isolated producers,

firms continue to enter industry

driving out firms from, industry

one.
Applying the definitions of profit and rent from the
last section we find that the rent is R 3, the net revenue
from the isolated production of good one.

Because is o 

lated good one production still exists and yields the
lowest net revenue it is the opportunity cost of all
locations.

If a landlord attempts

from a producer of good two,

to extract more than R 3

the firm, merely exchanges

locations with a good one producer by offering its land
lord R 3 plus s.
<p = R 3 = min

Competition drives

z to zero.

The rent

(R3, R 1*) . 6 7

The profit levels of the various potential activities
are

tt 1

where

+
it1
*

tt2

>

=
tt 1

R 1 + R 2 - h,
+

tt2

>

it 3

.

ir3 =

R 3 - 5 , and -** = R 1* - 1,

The adjustment rule is that the

activity with the highest profit drives cut the activity
with the lowest.

Hence,

firms continue to enter industry

two as isolated producers,

thus driving out firms from

industry one.
Following this scenario to one of many possible ou t
comes,

assume that as firms enter industry

two, R 1* falls

*7

R 1 + R 2 is not included in the min (*)
because no location houses such production.

statement

into equality with R 1 + R 2 .

This is shown in Figure V-7.

Because at this point isolated good two production has the
same

profitability as joint production,

the firms c u r 

rently producing good one in isolation may or may not leave
industry one.
production.

However,

they will not continue isolated

Because the net revenue of isolated good one

production remains below the other potential activities
it is eliminated from all sites;
joint production.
becomes min

Thus,

the opportunity cost of a location

(R 1 + R 2 , R 1*) .

assumed by Figure V-7,

some sites will house

Because they are equal,

as

the rent wipes out all the profit

and the industries are in equilibrium.

a1 +

tt2

=

tt 3

=

a 1* =

0 . 68

There are six other possible equilibria,
and labeled in Figures V - 3 — V-13.

all shown

In all cases excess

profits are zero and the rent absorbs all of the net
revenue yielded by production at each location.

It is

important to note that these equilibria do not depend on
the initial position of the industry adjustment process,
but depend on the relative demands and costs including the
effect of the externality.

From any disequilibrium,

same equilibrium will obtain,

the

determined only by the rela

tive costs and demands in the two industries.
The industry adjustment process in the case of p o l 
lution is the same as in its absence.
Cg

The activity with

The excess profit of an activity which is pursued
at no location is definitionally zero.
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FIGURE V-7
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FIGURE V - 8
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FIGURE V-9
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FIGURE V-10
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FIGURE V - l 1
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FIGURE V-12
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FIGURE V-13
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the highest profit drives out the activity with the lowest,
and all resources are sold at their opportunity cost.
the case of scarce locations,

In

the opportunity cost of a

site is the lowest net revenue attained by production at
any site.

Conclusions
The implications of these results in terms of the
Coase Theorem are:
1)

The equilibrium of the competitive market mechani

in the Coasian case exhibits the optimality conditions
derived in the previous chapter.

The assumptions made

about the behavior of the market participants are that
producers profit maximize and that landlords rent maximize.
Profit max imization ensures the marginal cost efficiency
conditions.

Competition and rent maximization cause p r o 

duction at each location to afford the same, rent and the
rent absorbs all of the net revenue.

Thereby,

the industry

size conditions for Pareto optimality are fulfilled.

Thus,

the Coase Theorem h o l d s .
2)

In order to achieve optimality and because of

competition,

pollution may or may not exist in the economy

or at any particular site.

The allocation of resources in

such a way that no externality exists

is as important in

achieving efficiency as is its correct internalization
where it does occur.

At the locations where the ext er 

nality is optimally avoided,

it is interesting to note
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that the net revenue or quasi-rent does not exist to allow
pollution to exist.

The competitive mec han ism assures

this .
3)

Liability does not matter.

so must a rent.

If pollution exists

Rent maximization by the landlord precludes

the effect of the liability rule.

Even if firms in industry

one are not sanctioned by lav; for their pollution,

the

number of polluting firms will not expand past the ef fi 
cient level.

New firms will not enter industry one and

cause pollution unless they can make the net revenues
necessary to pay the rent afforded by isolated good two
production.
production,

If efficiency requires isolated good two
the competitive mechani sm will not afford the

net revenue sufficient to drive out the isolated producers.
This is true e^en though the firms in industry one may
legally pollute.
4)

If at a particular location more than one land

lord exists or if no landlord exists,
mitigated.

If no landlord exists,

the results are not

the firms in the industry

with the pollution property right will effectively become
the landlords.

If more than one landlord exists,

ing among them will produce the efficient

b a rg ain

s o l u t i o n . ^

69
'This assumes that bargaining among the landlords
can be carried out with zero transactions costs.
If so, the
maximum rent at any one location is the efficient rent.
However, there is a problem with extortion in this case
as will be discussed in the next chapter.
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Summary
This chapter has presented a proof of the Coase
Theorem.
zation,

It has been demonstrated that profit m a xi mi 
rent max imization and competition for scarce loca

tions will result in the fulfillment of the Pareto condi
tions for a Type III externality.

The marginal cost

conditions are satisfied by joint profit maximization where
the existence of the externality is called for and by
simple profit maximization where it is not.

Rent m a x i 

mization ensures that the externality exists at the effi
cient number of locations.

The distinction between rent

and excess profit points out how the competitive mechanism
adjusts the output of the two industries and generates
the net revenue necessary to create or stop pollution
where required for efficiency.

As held by Coase,

the

definition of property rights has no effect on the solution.

CH APT ER VI
IMPLICATIONS AND EXTENSIONS OF THE RESULTS

Introduction
The previous chapters have developed the necessary co n
ditions for Pareto welfare maxi mization in three different
models.

These models are specified in a way consistent with

both the Pigovian and Coasian concepts of the externality
problem.

From an examination of these three models the

Pigovian and Coasian traditions are reconciled and the Coase
Theorem proven.
The conclusions reached in this paper follow from the
specification of the aggregate externality constraint used
in the three models.

These specifications were developed

by appealing to an outline of externality problems that
separates the publicness or privateness of reception from
the question of bargaining costs.
Bargaining costs have been used in the past to d i s 
tinguish the Pigovian and Coasian cases.

This has caused

confusion in both analysis and policy implications.
(72)

points out that both Buchanan and Coase,

Baumol

in letters,

express confusion and concern over who should pay for p o l 
lution in the laundry-factorv example.

The possibilities

run the gamut from all should pay to either the producer
or receiver of the externality should receive compensation.
104
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At the same time that results of the small number case
have cast doubt on Pigovian policy,

the question of who

should pay has been used to attack the small number case
itself.

If, as the proponents of the Coase Theorem claim,

the liability rule is inconsequential,

the question of who

should pay does not affect industry adjustment.

However,

other writers have claimed that industry adjustment and
equilibria are,

in fact,

affected by the liability rule.

The liability rule is not symmetric and,

hence,

the Coase

Theorem does not hold.
By addressing the public/private reception question
separately,

we are able to consistently identify the appro

priate policy and thereby reconcile these opposing views.
This chapter reviews the reconciliation of the Pigovian
and Coasian traditions and the proof of the Coase Theorem
presented in the preceeding chapters.

Extensions and

ramifications of the Coase The orem are then studied.

Review of the Findings
The outline of externality problems suggested by co n
sidering both public/private reception and large/small
numbers is fourfold.
tion;

Type I is large number,

Type II is large number,

III is small number,
small number,

70

private reception;

private reception;

public reception.

Type IV is ignored here.

public rece p

7n
u

Type

and Type IV is

The xnteresting thing
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about this scheme,

however,

is the notion of privateness.

The key contribution of this research is that the cause of
private reception can be the scarcity of locations in the
reception area.

In fact,

in Type III externalities this is

assumed to always be the case.
Public reception means that the amount of the ext e r 
nality received by one firm in no way diminishes the amount
available to others.

On the other hand,

private reception

is a situation where the amount of the externality avai l
able is somehow constrained.

This can occur either by a

reduction in the quantity of externality due to reception
by one firm or by a reduction in the locations available
for the reception of externality due to the existence of a
receiving firm.

Who Should Pay?
The public reception case is addressed by Model I.
The results are clearly that the producer of the e x t e r n a l 
ity should pay a price equal to the harm caused by the
externality.

This payment is recognised in both the

average cost and the marginal cost requirements for each
firm.

The receiving firm in the public case should not

be taxed or compensated.

Again,

this result is showrn by

the absence of explicit externality expressions in either
the marginal or average cost conditions for the receiving
firm.

This result is intuitively pleasing.

public reception case,

In the

no scarcity of the externality
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exists.

71

Thus,

the price of the externality raced by the

receiving firm should be zero.
The private reception case is developed in both Models
II and III.

Model II examines a situation where the actual

aggregate quantity of the externality is reduced by the
amount received by one firm.

The welfare maximizing co nd i

tions in the case of a positive externality are identical
to those of a normal input produced as the joint product of
an output.

The producing firm is compensated for the

externality and the receiving firm pays for the portion
of the externality it receives.
negative the reverse holds:

70
“

If the externality is

producers pay and receivers

are compensated.
In general,
property rights
externality,

a problem of defining and protecting the
is the causal factor of such a Type II

either positive or negative.

For instance, we

may have a positive externality problem because the spillover is a "common access" resource to the receivers.
Government action is called for.

73

The form of this g o ve rn 

ment action could be a Pigovian tax where the tax rate is
71

.
.
.
Scarcity of the externality means ability to avoid
the effects if negative.
7?
An example in a normal market is where the by-products
of cracking gasoline are sold to firms that use them as
inputs.
73

The case of shrimp growing up in marsh lands was
found by Maloney et. al. (77) to be such an externality.
The problem of the commons occurs in the ocean where property
rights are hard to define.
The externality is that oystering, clamming, and crabbing affect the number and size of
shrimp leaving the estuary.
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'

P2
nality.

This rate is levied per unit of e x t e r 

Externality producers should be charged at this

rate and externality receivers compensated at this rate for
negative spillovers.

The direction of the payment changes

with the sign of the externality.
Alternatively,

the externality may be privately

received because of the scarcity of locations in the rece p
tion area.

This situation is examined in Model III.

Model

III was extended to include the possibility of isolated
production.

The results are simply that the firms involved

in the externality at any location must act lihe joint
profit maximizers.
It is the extended Model III that gives the welfare
conditions pertinent to the Coase Theorem.
avoid the negative externality,
Hence,

a rent exists.

If firms cannot

locations must be scarce.

Assuming zero transactions costs the

rent maximizing behavior of the landlords yields o p t i 
mality.

Optimality requires that the rents be equal across

all locations.
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3y explicitly noting that the cause of

the externality is the scarcity of locations,

rent m a x i 

mization can be shown to produce a Pareto welfare maximum.
Thus the Coase Theorem is demonstrated.
Traditionally,

the Coase Theorem has implied either

party can be made to pay for the externality.

More

74See Model II, Table III-l.
^^Joint profit maximization ensures that the rents
are maximized at each location.
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precisely,

Chapters III and IV show that both parties should

be made to pay.

In Type III externalities,

Theorem is directly applicable,

where the Coase

both parties are made to

pay in terms of the rent collected by the landlords.
autonomous firms are involved in the externality,

If

the lia

bility rule is inconsequential precisely because both
parties pay rent equal to the exact amount of their share
of the maxi mum joint profits.
If we apply Model III to the case of Type II exter
nalities where the externality is private due to scarce
locations,

the result is also that all parties should pay.

This is a large number case because the number of producers
or receivers at each location prohibits bargaining.

The

Pareto requirements are simply that all the firms at each
location joint prof it maximize.

A straightforward gove rn

ment policy is to act as the auctioneer of environmental
purity.

The po lluting firms pay for pollution rights;

the externality receiving firms pay for purity.
government revenues,

maximizes welfare.

Maximizing

Even though within

a single pollution area the externality is a public good
subject to the free rider problem,
receiving parties to pay.

government can force all

The technique of the taxing

procedure requires further study outside of this investi
gation.
ducer

The point here is that theoretically both pro
and receiver should pay.
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Summary
We can summarize these results in such a way as to
delineate the externality situations relevant to the
Pigovian tradition and those relevant to the Coase Theorem.
A)

Type I externalities are Pigovian cases.
A simple, unilateral tax or subsidy like that
proposed by Baumol is appropriate.

B)

Type III externalities are pure Coasian
cases.
No government policy at all is re
quired to achieve efficiency.

C)

Type II externalities fall under both the
policy
prescriptions of Pigou and Coase.
i.)

If the
externality
is private because
the available quantity is reduced by
the reception of one firm, a bilateral
tax and subsidy scheme is called for.
This is the type of Pigovian tax
discussed by Meade and Gould.

ii)

If the
externality
is private because
of
the
scarcity of
locations in the
reception area, the rent maximizing
results of the pure Coasian case
must be implemented by government.

Thus are the Pigovian and Coasian traditions reconciled.

Ramifications of the Coase Theorem
Probably the most obvious criticism of the Coase
Theorem is that zero transactions costs are assumed.
writers,

notably Baumol

(72), Daly

(74), and Coase

Many

(60),

have argued that transactions costs will significantly
diminish the applications of the Coase Theorem in real
world problems.
The essence of the controversy is whether
the Coase Theorem can legitimately be applied
to problems of pollution control in the typical
situation involving large numbers of affected

Ill
parties, not all of wh o m have access to capital
"If.
m a r k e t s .'D

There are a number of issues involved here.

First, when

does the largeness of numbers create insurmountable trans
actions costs?

Second, when is the externality publicly

received so that the Coase The orem becomes analytically
inappropriate in spite of transactions costs?

Finally,

what is the extension of Coase's arguments to consumers
involved in externality problems?
These questions cannot be completely addressed here,
mainly because the analysis used in this research is not
formulated to answer them.

However,

our analysis does

give some insight into these problems.

Public Reception in Actual Pollution Problems
Inasmuch as the pollution is public,

the Coase Theorem

is never applicable either in terms of the necessity or form
of government action.

However,

by the analysis presented

in this paper the actual existence of the Type I externality
problem is very much in doubt.

It appears that purely

publicly received externalities are unlikely because of
the general scarcity of locations everywhere.

This fact

implies that the simple Pigovian tax is never applicable.
The appropriate government policy,

then, becomes one of

taxing all parties of the locationally specific externality

7

Fisher and Peterson

(76), page 4.
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or doing nothing.

The Coase Theorem offers both alter

natives .
This result is mitigated somewhat by the vagaries
of nature.

Pollution may affect one area or another in

a very random fashion.

However,

the appropriate tax asks

receivers to pay for reducing the expected damage of p o l 
lution,

and then charges the polluters that same price at

the equilibrium.

Bargaining Costs
The problem of bargaining costs addressed in the liter
ature centers on two points.

First,

if bargaining costs

are too high to allow private internalization,

the cost of

information necessary to implement the appropriate go ve r n 
ment policy is also prohibitive.

The appropriate gove rn

ment policy can never be implemented and, hence,

standards

are the most efficient means of achieving a welfare m a x i 
mum.

Second,

if government taxing policy is used,

Buchanan-Stubblebine problem appears.
ization,

the

Private internal

if possible, will move the parties away from the

welfare maximum.
Both of these arguments are based on the confusion'
between public and private reception.
out,

As we have pointed

if the externality is private by the fact of scarce

locations,

two conclusions result.

Bot parties should

pay and the payment is made from rents on locations.
The fact that the tax in a large number case should
be levied on both parties instead of one, means that

ili
government can gain information about the severity of the
pollution by the tax revenues obtained from the receivers.
In many cases it can be shown that taxing measures with
administratively simple adjustment rules lead to the ef.ficient solution.

77

Thus,

even if private bargaining faces
—T Q

prohibitive transactions costs government action may not.
Moreover,

because all parties pay,

Stubblebine argument is inappropriate.

the BuchananAt the efficient

solution there will be no tendency for parties to move
away.

Buchanan and Stubblebine assumed a unilateral

Pigovian tax.

With such a tax the pollution receiver still

has a marginal incentive to bargain even at the optimal
position.
ment,

If bargaining costs are underestimated by g o v e r n 

a unilateral tax creates inefficiency.

However,

the tax mechani sm suggested by the Coase Theorem does not
generate this problem.

When both parties pay a tax,

there is no marginal incentive toward further bargaining
at the optimal solution even if bargaining is possible.

Other Government Action
Government,

however,

may find that certain measures

can be undertaken to facilitate private internalization.
77

Maloney et. al.
externality.
7R

(77)

given an example for a Type II

Private bargaining may be prohibited because the
property right is uncertain, antitrust laws jeopardize the
agreement, extortion may be accused, or consumers are
involved,
Of course the benefit to the affected parties
may be so small as to make internalization inefficient by
either government or private action.
Government faces none
of the former problems, however.
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On the other hand,
propriate.

some government action is clearly inap

Examples of these are discussed belov/.

An implication of the Coase Theorem is that the pr o
perty rights to a location must be independent of any
production.

Obviously,

the owner of the property right

must be able to allow the production mix at the location to
change whenever relative profitabilities c h a n c e .

In terms

of policy this means that where the usage of government
owned properties are involved,

leasing agreements should

not be associated with specific production re qu i r e m e n t s .
An example of this is the wetlands owned by the State of
South Carolina.

Current policy provides for the leasing

of such for oysteri-ng.

However,

the lease agreement speci

fically calls for a certain amount of oystering and renewal
of the beds.
lands,

To maintain the ownership right to the w e t 

the leasee mus t produce oysters even though this may

not be the appropriate output at any given point in time.
To lock a leasee into a specific output combination

(in this

case by requirements on production technology employed)
will have a detrimental effect on the efficiency of pro
duction.

Acceptable policy would be to lease the rights

to this land to the highest bidder to do with as he wishes.
Where the taxing authority owns the locations it can itself
act as the landlord to achieve the optimum solution by
maximizing the rents at each location.

"^There is the problem of completely changing the
characteristics of the land.
This may be bad because of
the national or state heritage, public good aspects.
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Zoning causes a problem similar to production require
ments.

Where zoning captures the basic externality chara c

teristics of land use it may be beneficial because it reduces
transactions costs.

For instance,

a general residential

zoning ordinance may be the first step towards residential
development internalizing spillover benefits.

However,

the cost it imposes is that the land use patterns cannot
change dramatically even if that is the optimal solution.
And when a dramatic change is in question,

the process used

to determine the efficacy of the change is not as sensitive
as the market m e c h a n i s m . ^0
The effect of judicial interpretation in cases which
fulfill the requirements of the Type III externality is
effectively zero in the long r u n . ^

The courts in these

cases can do no more than set property rights which u l t i 
mately have no effect except to realign the rents.

However,

if we introduce non-zero bargaining costs or transactions
costs into the model,

appropriate public policy might be

to define the oldest firm as having the property right.

O^

This is true especially if public policy stresses rapid
convergence to the optimal solution.

Because the property

®^The political mechanis m as opposed to the price
mechanism is used to change the zoning ordinances.
^ F c r instance, in the cases related by Coase (60)
where the courts were used to assign property rights the
outcome is expected to have had no effect on industry
production.
^ B r u c e Yandle, Senior Economist, President's Council
on Wage and Price Stability, 1976-1977, reports to us that
the Environmental Protection Agency is considering such a
policy.
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right can be defined in either way it also follows that it
can be defined in both ways between different pairs of
firms involved in the same interindustry externality.

The

effect of defining the property right with the oldest firm
is to prohibit the gaming or extortion that might take
place if one industry or the other has the property right
at each location.
Consider Figure VI-1.
property right to pollute.

Assume industry one has

the

The landlords of the sites

appropriate for industry one in Sector A can receive rents
in the amount of the excess profits available to the iso
lated producers of good two located there.
run,

however,

In the short

entry or the threat of entry by a polluter

might be required in order to gain these rents.
words,

In other

if the landlord at an industry two site is reluctant

to give up his rent,

the landlord of the industry one site

will allow a firm to enter.
does occur,

If entry into industry one

the landlord of the circled site in Figure VI-1

gains rent equal to the profit of a joint venture or equal
to the profit of isolated production of good one.

This

will drive the price of good one down just enough to make
it profitable for another firm in industry one to cease
production.

But the landlord of exiting firm will co n

tinue to receive the rent paid by the firm in industry
two.

This is inefficient if entry and exit are costly

or if capital is not perfectly mobile.

FIGURE VI-1

OO

Industry One

Industry Two

<4—

A

B

118

This pro blem could be eliminated if the oldest firm
automatically had the property right.

Again it makes no

difference on efficiency grounds who has it.

The property

right definition only determines which landlord gets the
rents if the two sites at each location are owned sepa
rately.

However,

if the oldest firm has the property right

the landlords of industry two in Sector A, Figure VI-1,
would be entitled to the rents regardless of who gets them
in Sector B.

There would be no gaming involved in o b t a i n 

ing potential rents.

For instance,

if demand for industry

one increased it would cause profit to increase and the
number of firms in industry one to increase.

The situation

in terms of who is paid the rents would be exactly the
same as if industry two, as an industry,
right:

had the property

entrants into industry one would be forced

pay the industry two landlords;

to

and the gaming problem

described above would be avoided.

Multiple Industries
A final extension of the Coase Theorem is that it
applies to mul tiple industry externality situations.
Where any two firms are associated by an externality there
is definitely no necessity for government intervention
except in terms of the definition of property rights due
to equity considerations.

This is true even if the two

firms are in industries not usually associated by an exter 
nality.

Consider an example.

Assume one industry is an

obnoxious polluter causing harm to surrounding

(but only
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closely proximating)

firms wherever its firms locate.

Public policy is to do nothing to internalize this cost.
If the firm of

the random industry that is harmed in each

case can profitably move,

it will.

ate bargaining

solution will result.

will similarly

locate,

most profitable.

If not,

the a pp ro pr i

The polluting firms

as they should, where they find it

Liability for pollution can be assigned

to the polluter or not without affecting the output levels
of any good.

A Final Word
The one extension of these results that was carefully
avoided was to consumers.
Theorem are raised,

Whenever criticisms of the Cease

this is usually found.

The normal

unwillingness to discuss consumers is the problem of income
effects.

However,

that is not the case here and probably

should not be the case elsewhere.
The proof of the Coase Theorem offered here does net
sidestep the existence of income effects due to the po l l u 
tion property rights.

It merely shows they do net affect

the necessary conditions for a welfare maximum.
paid to the location owners are income.

The rents

This income may

change the pattern of demand and affect industry output
and aggregate pollution.

Even so, the welfare conditions

are unaltered.
The implication,
are involved,

then,

is if consumers instead of firms

there is no difference.

Transactions costs

may be increased but assume these are infinite and we are
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concerned with the appropriate government policy.
Coasian tax appears appropriate.

The

This may be so but it

deserves further study.
In general the form and mec ha ni sm of the Coasian tax in
large number,

privately received externalities requires

further investigation.

The question of what to do with the

tax revenues may not be easily resolved.

Because all p a r 

ties should pay, when consumers are involved they are taxing
themselves and paying the revenues back to themselves.
This problem may or may not mitigate the application of
such a tax.
Regardless of these extensions,

the Coase Theorem

stands as an important theoretical pillar of externality
theory.

Examining it in the way suggested by this work

points out its richness.
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